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ABSTRACT 
Moving target defense (MTD) is a promising strategy for gaining advantage over 
cyber attackers, but these dynamic reconfigurations can impose significant overhead. We 
propose implementing MTD within an optimization framework so that we seize defensive 
advantage while minimizing overhead. This dissertation presents an MTD scheme that 
leverages partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) with absorbing 
states to select the optimal defense based on partial observations of the cyber attack 
phase. In this way, overhead is minimized as reconfigurations are triggered only when 
the potential benefit outweighs the cost. We formulate and implement a POMDP within 
a system with Monte-Carlo planning-based decision making configured to reflect 
defender-defined priorities for the cost-benefit tradeoff. The proposed system also 
includes a performance-monitoring scheme for continuous validation of the model, 
critical given attackers’ ever-changing techniques. We present simulation results that 
confirm the system fulfills the design goals, thwarting 99% of inbound attacks while 
sustaining system availability at greater than 94% even as probability of attack 
phase detection dropped to 0.74. A comparable system that triggered MTD 
techniques pseudorandomly maintained just 43% availability when providing equivalent 
attack suppression, which illustrates the utility of our proposed scheme. 
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Despite significant and ever-growing cybersecurity investment [1], cyberspace remains a
perilous place. Companies face a nearly one in three chance of experiencing a data breach
within the next two years [2], 10% of Americans fall victim to cyber-perpetrated identity
theft annually [3], and one in 400 emails is malicious [4]. Cyber attackers hold a significant
advantage, in part because they control the time, tempo, and target of their assaults.
During the U.S. National Cyber Leap Year Summit of 2009, authorities touted moving
target defense (MTD) as a game-changing cybersecurity concept that would finally reduce
this long-held advantage [5]. MTD dynamically alters protected systems to make them less
predictable and thus more difficult to attack [5]. A large number of distinct MTD techniques
have been cataloged [6] includingmutations of system addresses or software, randomization
of memory layout and variation of data formats [6]. Each impacts predictability differently,
but unfortunately, each can also impact the performance of the defended system. MTD
techniques carry overhead like temporary system outages or increases in network traffic
load as reconfigurations are deployed [7].
For MTD to achieve truly advantage-shifting results, we need to identify techniques that
can amplify the unpredictability of the attack surface [7] without imposing performance-
degrading overhead costs [8]. Unfortunately, these are often competing goals [9], as il-
lustrated in Figure 1.1. Defender perspective of MTD ranges from unmanageable wherein
reconfigurations are so cumbersome legitimate communications are impossible, through a
manageable level of disruption, to the ideal invisible case in which users of the defended
system have no awareness reconfigurations are occurring. From the attacker perspective,
the changes range from drastic enough to make the attack surface unpredictable, through
changes routine enough to be predictable, to the static case in which changes are nonex-
istent. Implementing MTD is an optimization effort to find the point of balance where an




Figure 1.1. Implementing MTD requires trade-off to balance manageability
for defenders with unpredictability for attackers
Seeking innovative ways to achieve this balance, we turned to biomimicry, the discipline of
finding engineering solutions in nature [11]. We examined predator-prey co-adaptation for
relevant strategies because the attacker-defender arms race in cybersecurity creates a similar
system [12]. The interplay between bats and moths stood out for particular alignment with
aspects of MTD.
Bats first flewbetween 60 and 95million years ago, adding an ability to echolocate 50million
years ago [13]. Phased-use of specific amplitude and frequency combinations permits the
bat to both scan wide areas and hone in on an individual moth via a terminal buzz [14].
This lethal skill combination enabled bats to dominate predation of nocturnal flying insects
until moths developed counter-detection strategies to ensure their own survival [13].
In one such strategy, certain moth species evolved ultrasonic sound detection capabilities
[13]. These moths used their awareness of bat echolocation signals to develop graded
evasive responses wherein the moth changes its movement depending on the hunting phase
of the bat [14]. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, a faintly detected bat can be ignored in favor
of continuing other activity. Should a bat in wide area scan be detected, the moth avoids
predation by flying out of the area [14]. A bat in the final, terminal buzz phase of the hunt
drives the moth to conduct erratic and high-energy maneuvers or dive into leaf-provided
acoustic cover [14].
2
Figure 1.2. Graded evasive response in moths. Inset source: [15].
Graded evasive response has been conclusively observed in thirteen of the nineteen insect
families capable of ultrasonic detection, underscoring the clear survival advantage of this
strategy [13] andmaking a compelling case for exploring howgraded evasive responsemight
help in MTD. Where the moth wants to avoid the bat for a minimum energy expenditure,
the defender similarly wants to avoid the attacker for the minimum performance sacrifice.
With the moths in mind, we sought a path to implementing MTD as a graded reaction to
cyber attackers so that effectiveness and manageability can both be achieved.
1.1 Objective
The objective of this dissertation is to develop a system capable of simultaneously enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of MTD in presenting an unpredictable attack surface and controlling
overhead to maintain manageability. As depicted in Figure 1.3, the proposed cyber defense
system uses data on attack patterns and system specifications coupled with real-time at-
tack assessment to trigger an optimal defensive action, just as the moth uses instinct and

















Figure 1.3. Alignment between moth defenses and an optimized MTD
scheme
The core mechanism selected to optimally achieve both goals is the partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP). The proposed system, diagrammed in Figure 1.4,
includes POMDP formulation, MTD selection, and performance monitoring to identify the
optimal action stream a(t) based on the incoming observation streamω(t), which represents













Figure 1.4. The proposed system leverages POMDP to implement cost-
controlled MTD.
Such a system is possible because, like the phases of a bat hunt, cyber attacks have distinct
phases that occur before an exploit ultimately compromises a device or the attacker goal
is otherwise reached [16]. Moreover, such phases require attacker activity that is at least
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partially observable by the defender [17], [18] and that follows a pattern that can be distilled
from forensics of previous attacks [19]. Using this knowledge, MTD can be triggered to the
degree and with the timing required to thwart attacks without the excess overhead that leads
to unmanageability.
1.2 Related Work
There are three categories of related work influential in developing our solution toward
optimal implementation of MTD. These include generic works related to Markov models,
specific cybersecurity applications of POMDP, and finally non-Markovian efforts to op-
timally employ MTD. This section reviews work from each to highlight where we have
adopted and expanded the efforts of other researchers.
1.2.1 Markov Models
To understand the mechanics of absorbingMarkov chains, Markov decision process (MDP),
and POMDP, we leaned heavily onmaterial from [20], [21] and [22], respectively, extending
the fundamentals described in these reference materials to fit the specific context of the
envisioned system. The discussion of absorbing Markov chains in [20] was instrumental
in developing the predicted performance equations that are critical to the performance
monitoring scheme. The descriptions of MDP and POMDP in [21] and [22] confirmed
applicability of the model in meeting our design objectives.
While POMDP have been in circulation for decades [23], recent advances make the model
more practically adoptable in real-world systems. In particular, online policy development
techniques open the door to new applications [24]. In this context, online refers to the
way in which these techniques use a forward search from the current status of the opera-
tional environment, constructing the decision making policy in step with its execution [25].
Offline techniques, on the other hand, construct standing policies covering all possible con-
tingencies so that policy execution is via look-up [25]. Because online techniques construct
policies for specific circumstances, rather than for all possible contingencies, online tech-
niques can support systems with much higher dimensionality, and thus complexity, before
computational intractability becomes a concern [24].
The two key advances in online policy development fundamental to our proposed system
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are partially observable Monte Carlo planning (POMCP) [26] and follow-on determinized
sparse partially observable tree planning (DESPOT) [24]. POMCP facilitated scaling up
the previous benchmarks in computationally tractable POMDP dimensionality by several
orders of magnitude [26]. DESPOT, in turn, improved poor worst-case behavior exhibited
by POMCP [24]. As such, our system was built using DESPOT to facilitate action selection
from the observation stream and POMDP formulation.
POMDP-based cybersecurity research is generally separated by policy technique. Three use
offline solution techniques in developing policies [27]–[29]. This limits the dimensionality
the models can incorporate before intractability becomes a concern, though state-of-the-
art tools like successive approximations of the reachable space under optimal policies
(SARSOP) facilitated significant capacity in the work by Sarraute et al. [28].
1.2.2 POMDP in Cybersecurity
We identified six examples in which POMDP was used to model attack-defense dynamics
to improve cybersecurity. A summary of the aspects of each formulation is provided in
Table 1.1. The dimensionality columns represent the number of states |s |, actions |a|, and
observations |ω | that the researchers used in abstracting a cybersecurity system into a
POMDP.
Table 1.1. POMDP-based cyber defense systems
Lead Author Year
Dimensionality Policy Technique
|s | |a| |ω| Offline Online Tool
Kreidl [27] 04 18 3 6 3 Manual Heuristic Approx.
Sarraute [28] 12 20 5 20 3 SARSOP
Zonouz [30] 14 64 6 IDS 3 3 Value Iteration and
Finite Look-ahead
Tipireddy [29] 17 2 3 2 3 Incremental Pruning
Miehling [31] 18 186 16 8 3 Modified POMCP
Musman [32] 19 8 4 8 3 DESPOT
These offline works were influential in understanding cybersecurity model formulation. The
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hierarchical approach in [28] was useful in approaching a detailed host-based model, rather
than attempting a network-wide model, as the authors demonstrate how host-based models
can be combined to track network-wide security [28]. It should be noted that [28] was the
only effort intended to optimize attack, rather than defense, but otherwise the structure of
the model remains well-aligned with our approach. Influencing the states in our host-based
model, Kreidl et al. [27] use a multi-phase attack model similar to the one we eventually
adopted in our system. Although MTD was not the focus of [27], the multi-stage attack was
attractive for our system because MTD impacts each attack phase differently [33], and a
model that represents attack phases is thus necessary to capture this impact. Additionally,
the results in [27] support the need for appropriate treatment of incomplete observability in
cybersecurity systems, as the authors’ improved feedback controller based on the POMDP
formulation was able to successfully reject false alarms from the intrusion detection system,
whereas a strict rule-based controller was not [27].
The offline approach by Tipireddy et al. [29] was the most reproducible of the field and
thus important in gaining experience working with POMDP in a cybersecurity context
before formulating our own model. In particular, [29] performed sensitivity analysis across
many of the model components, which was helpful in understanding how changes in each
component can impact the overall performance of a POMDP-based defensive system.
Online solution techniques as employed by the remaining three works handle much larger
dimensionality. In particular, experimentation demonstrated that the modified version of
POMCP developed by Miehling et al. [31] generates decisions for models exceeding 100
million states. Both Zonouz et al. [30] and Miehling et al. [31] influenced the way in
which we represented attackers in our model formulation. The former validated the ability
of a POMDP-based approach to optimally defend against an adversary who omnipotently
takes the most harmful adversarial actions [30]. The latter varies attacker type between a
finite set of choices which define the attacker skill, aggression, and detectability [31]. Both
were useful in understanding how to incorporate the variability of attackers into a single
model. Reviewing these efforts drove us to attempt to incorporate the most likely attacker
complimented by a mechanism that verifies that attacker is indeed the one being faced.
The study conducted by Musman et al. [32] provides specific tool validation as it compares
the autonomous decisions of aDESPOT-controlled cyber response engine to those generated
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via SARSOP. In the most extreme case of computational efficiency improvement, the
DESPOT-controlled responses matched within 0.8% in attained value for less than 0.03%
of the computational time [32]. The scenario was scaled specifically to facilitate this online-
offline comparison [32], and as a result, the work was useful as an independent validation
of DESPOT in a cybersecurity context before we selected it for use in our proposed system.
Although not POMDP-related, one other work needs to be mentioned because absorbing
Markov chains became particularly influential in our work. We found one other instance in
which absorbing Markov chain theory was used in a cybersecurity application. Abraham
and Nair use an absorbing Markov chain to describe the dynamics of movement through an
attack graph [34]. Expected path length and state visits quantify a security metric for the
network [34]. We adopt these metrics in an expanded form that incorporates the impact of
defensive actions, costs, and partial observability.
Our proposed system builds on and departs from all of these works in key ways. First, the
other models do not focus on MTD optimization. Rather, they generally look at when to
perform system recovery after attack, rather than when to initiate preventative reconfigu-
rations. Second, we validate our proposed system via an implementation model built via
measurements of event probabilities and objective overhead factors from real-world cyber
events, while the works surveyed employed expert, yet subjective, rubric-based assessments.
Finally, we implement a scheme to continuously monitor how well the POMDP aligns with
actual conditions, which was not incorporated into any of the other works.
1.2.3 Optimizing MTD
The research described in three references focuses on non-Markov methods for optimal
implementation of MTD, which also relates to and influences our proposed system. This
research is summarized in Table 1.2. All three efforts look at techniques in which the
overhead expended for MTD can be minimized in balance with maximizing effectiveness.
Two of the references conduct analysis to identify static parameters for system implemen-
tation that achieve optimization. Wang et al. [35] use attack traces from distributed denial
of service attacks to develop a probability of attack arrival based on historical inter-arrival
times. Using a range of values from 1 – 100 to define a generic cost structure, MTD is trig-
gered when benefit outweighs cost based on probability of attack in the near-term [35]. This
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Table 1.2. MTD overhead minimization
Lead Author Year Trigger # MTD Descriptiontechniques
DeLoach [10] 14 Random, Reactive 1 Virtual Machine Migration
Wang [35] 16 Random 1 Virtual Machine Migration
Connell [8] 18 Random 2 IP Address, Service Reconfig.
work was an important step toward understanding optimization in the context of realistic
attack patterns. Connell et al. [8] determine optimal reconfiguration inter-arrival times for
two MTD techniques, which sets their research apart. The work presented in [8] is a spe-
cific detailed example of the generic framework for combining MTD techniques explored
in [36], and both were instructive in our effort to study optimization when combinations of
techniques are employed. Additionally, the overhead measurements in [8] were invaluable
in facilitating our validation effort, as these measurements provided an objective cost basis
for our validation model and also facilitated comparison between our proposed system and
a comparable state-of-the-art random MTD scheme.
The final work explores an intelligent optimization system that triggers address reconfig-
urations both randomly and in reaction to detected attacker progress and changing system
requirements much like the one we propose. DeLoach et al. [10] propose three runtime
models to represent system performance constraints, available assets, and vulnerabilities.
These models are reasoned over to time a defensive reconfiguration. The research is com-
plimentary to ours in that it supports the use of stochastic models for controlling MTD
and explores the impact of uncertainty regarding attack detection on the effectiveness of
the system [10]. Our system works similarly but replaces the three runtime models with a
single POMDP that facilitates consideration of performance and security factors in a single
apparatus. We also use phase-based attack indications rather than an expected arrival rate
of attacks for optimal MTD triggering.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the dissertation details and validates the proposed system and is organized
as follows:Chapter 2 provides background information on cyber attacks,MTD,POMDP, and
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absorbing Markov chains necessary to describe our proposed system. Chapter 3 describes
our solutions approach with details of each subsystem provided in Chapters 4 through
6. Chapter 7 provides validation of the proposed system via a simulated implementation.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the contributions and avenues for
future work. There are four appendices. Appendix A contains a summary of the model
used in validation. Appendix B includes additional results from simulated operation of the
system. Appendix C describes the simulations conducted including hardware and software
employed with snippets of code critical to system operation. Appendix D contains an




In this chapter, we cover the background material necessary to describe the proposed
system. These topics fall into two areas. The first covers the cybersecurity context in which
our system will exist, split into discussions of cyber attack patterns and MTD. The second
area encompasses the optimization andmodeling concepts usedwithin our system to achieve
our design goal of decision making under uncertainty via POMDP and absorbing Markov
chains.
2.1 Cyber Attack Patterns
Proactive defense of a system requires an understanding of how attacks unfold. This section
provides background information related to trends in cyber attacks and how those trends
become predictive tools.
2.1.1 Trends and Statistics
The cyber kill chain describes a seven-step process by which an attacker compromises a
target [16]. The attacker moves from reconnaissance, to weaponization, delivery, exploita-
tion, installation, command and control, and finally the ultimate actions on objectives [37].
In wide circulation, this kill chain has been adopted and modified to facilitate various as-
pects of research in cybersecurity [37]. We adopt a simplified five-phase version in line
with [33] because its appears frequently in MTD literature [6], [33], [38], which is our area
of interest. The five-phase version includes reconnaissance, access, development, launch,







Figure 2.1. The five-phase cyber attack often used in MTD literature.
Adapted from [6].
Reconnaissance encompasses the activity the attacker conducts to research, identify, and
select a target [37]. For phishing attacks, which comprise as much as 95% of attacks in
recent years [39], this is the phase when the attacker gathers the email addresses and related
information necessary to make the phishing attempt believable. Such efforts often include
crawling internet websites, conference proceedings, social networks and similar resources.
Separately, attackers glean technical aspects of potential attack vectors via internet registries,
search engines, and other publicly available databases to understand the logical address and
domain name space of the target [16].
In the access phase, the attacker collects technical information specific to the target technol-
ogy necessary to gain access [33]. Social engineering,which involves deceptivelymanipulat-
ing individuals into divulging sensitive information, frequently facilitates accomplishment
of this phase [40]. Small scale experiments indicate 50% of people will reveal sensitive
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network details over the phone during such social engineering attacks [41]. Attack surface
enumeration is also possible via tools designed to rapidly scan large networks for the pur-
poses of network exploration and security auditing [42]. A study from 2011 found that
78% of the traffic inbound to a network was scan related [43]. In a small scale experiment,
approximately 50% of the attacks against two honeypots connected to the world wide web
were preceded by scan activity of some sort [17]. Such activity can be detected, albeit im-
perfectly, because it exhibits low packet-per-connection rates [17] or arrives at an unusually
large number of ports or devices on a single device or network, respectively [44].
In the development phase, the attacker selects or writes malware and packages it into a
deliverable payload. In some cases, attacks are tailored by technically adept adversaries,
but malware and exploits that go after wide spread vulnerabilities can also be obtained.
Threadkit, the most mentioned exploit kit on the dark web in 2018, can be purchased for
just $400 [45]. Such tools remain viable given that vulnerabilities have an average lifespan
of seven years [45]. One well understood problem from the common vulnerabilities and
exposures database made the Recorded Future top ten list of most exploited vulnerabilities
for three consecutive years, long after security officials weremade aware of the problem [45].
With patching inconsistent at the host-level, even the release of software patches can offer
attackers a cookbook for conducting attacks against un-patched systems [46].
The launch phase covers the transmission of the weapon to the target. In the case of advanced
persistent threat actors, data from the Lockheed Martin Computer Incident Response Team
collected from 2004-2010 indicates that the most prevalent delivery vectors for weaponized
payloads are email attachments, websites, and removable media [16]. Despite security
education, the majority of corporate data breaches are caused by human error in one of
these categories [47]. To ease delivery, client application data files such as Adobe portable
document format or Microsoft Office documents often serve as the weaponized deliverable
so that unsuspecting human users will help circumvent system security measures [16].
Email attacks circumvent enterprise security by luring privileged users into downloading
and executing malware [39]. Website delivery vectors often abuse the domain name system
by registering a name that resembles a well-known entity or editing legitimate records
to include malicious subdomains, both of which fool victims into downloading malware
themselves [48]. As for removable media, 29 different peripheral device types capable
of facilitating malware delivery were identified as of 2017, ranging from flash drives to
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keyboards [49]. Flash drives are particularly noteworthy. In a 2016 experiment, researchers
found that 98% of the flash drives dropped on a college campus were picked up and at
least 45% of them were subsequently connected to a device, with victims’ altruism and/or
curiosity driving them to both plug the drives in and open the contained files, usually without
taking any security precautions [50].
Once the delivered malware lands at the target system, it may or may not succeed in
compromising the device. Both the target defenses and the expertise with which the attack
was crafted will impact likelihood of success. Assuming that it succeeds, if persistent access
is desired, the attacker will take steps in the final persistence phase to ensure such access is
maintained via remote access trojans or other backdoor installations [16]. Data exfiltration
is a typical goal of this phase [16]. The adversary may also compromise a given host
for intermediate use permitting lateral motion to more lucrative victims [16]. Anomalous
activity on the protected system can indicate attainment of the persistence phase, with
detection methods relating to unusual computational load, network traffic volume, network
traffic destination, and privilege escalation examples of the many in circulation [51].
There are many variations of activity per phase, with each differing in likelihood of oc-
currence, success, and detection. Making sense of these compound possibilities to take
preventative action is the work of attack modeling.
2.1.2 Attack Models
Attack models translate the many events and statistics measured in forensic analysis of
cybersecurity events into probabilities useful in predicting, and ultimately preventing, the
next attack. These models first took their now familiar shape describing progress of an
attacker toward an objective in the attack graphs of the late 1980s [34]. As researchers
began to quantify multitudes of cybersecurity influences, stochastic processes became the
dominant technique by which they described attack progressions, especially when analysis
of event likelihood was desired [52].
The goals of stochastic attack models are varied. Certainly, research aims to improve
intrusion detection of in-progress attacks [53]–[56], but more proactive themes are also
in circulation [57]–[60]. For example, in [57], the authors combine stochastic modeling
with analysis of overarching patterns in cyber attacks to make recommendations regarding
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prioritization of security efforts.
In building a model for either purpose, there are a variety of ways of defining the set of
system states s and the set of system observations ω. The alert sequence of an intrusion
detection system (IDS) is a common template for defining states [54], [58]. Other options
include command sequence [53] and vulnerability life cycle [61]. The state of individual
hosts can combine to offer a summary of network state as a whole [60]. Another alternative
for network-wide analysis is to define s in terms of network nodes, particularly useful
when the goal of the model is to identify the probable next attack victim given the nodes
currently under attack [56]. Other authors have defined states in terms of the strings of
sequential exploits en route to an ultimate attack goal within a network regardless of
physical location [31], [34], [62]–[64].
Because of computational disadvantages in manipulating and analyzing models with large
state space, simplified models that combine all alerts into a smaller set of states aligned with
attack phases have proven useful [29], [55], [58]–[60], [65]. The chain can be completely
collapsed to just two states, good or compromised [29] or expanded to include intermediate
states along the lines of the cyber kill chain [8]. The observation set ω is often compressed
as well, from a direct feed of IDS alerts to some subset representing the results of initial
analysis, reducing the set of possible observations [55]. Even if s ≡ ω, retaining both
permits consideration of missed or false detection [54].
With states and observations defined, the probabilities of transitioning from any state or
observation to another are calculated from historical analysis of past attacks, either from
global or local data. Once compiled, the probabilities that events in the attack model (1)
occur and (2) are detected are used to put together metrics including attack occurrence and
timing [62]. These metrics can be used to assess security adequacy of a system and take
action to correct deficiencies [34].
2.2 Moving Target Defense
MTD corrects such deficiencies by initiating system changes that reduce the likelihood of
attack success by reducing the predictability of the attack surface [5]. MTD techniques are
classified based on the layer at which the reconfiguration occurs within five categories as
follows: dynamic data, dynamic software, dynamic run time environment, dynamic platform,
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and dynamic network [33]. Dynamic techniques also vary in the phase of attack they are
most likely to impact as summarized in Table 2.1. No single technique thus cataloged is
effective against all five attack phases, and most are effective against only one or two [6].









Platform 3 3 3
Runtime environment 3 3
Dynamic network techniques change network properties and configurations to thwart attack-
ers and are particularly effective during the reconnaissance and launch attack phases [33].
As a well known example of network MTD, in internet protocol (IP) hopping, network
addresses are regularly shuffled to ensure the knowledge gained during the attacker network
reconnaissance is perishable. By doing so, the defender prevents the attacker from control-
ling the tempo of attacks as actions must be taken before information becomes obsolete [7].
Such reconfiguration also disrupts standard techniques for flow and session isolation, which
decreases the likelihood a successful attack can be mounted [7]. Address mutation shows
particular promise toward deterring and deceiving reconnaissance-based attacks like mathe-
matically propagated worms while offering the added benefit of increasing the detectability
of such attacks [66]. Another technique, random route mutation, uses dynamic routing to
thwart adversarial eavesdropping and certain denial of service attacks and has been shown
in simulation to reduce attacked or disrupted traffic to just 10% of its pre-implementation
levels [67]. The 2018 survey of techniques cataloged nineteen unique examples of this type
of dynamic movement [6].
Under dynamic data techniques, data is dynamically modified in storage or presentation to
complicate the development of exploit payloads capable of harvesting data of interest [33].
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In one patented implementation, protected data is partitioned into multiple files that are
obfuscated via encryption and then moved around a computer network or remote cloud-
based environment [68]. As another example, relatively simple diversity in data formatting
as depicted in Table 2.2, though easy for the human brain to interpret, complicates data
exfiltration by making format-based extraction less likely to succeed [33]. Eight unique
examples of this type of MTD have been cataloged [6].
Table 2.2. Data presented differently to complicate exfiltration. Source: [33].
Format 1 Format 2
<Age = 23; <ID=00132573;
Gender = Male; Gender=M;
ID = 132573; Salary=75K;
Salary = $75000;> Age=10111;>
Dynamic software also impacts the development and launch phases and comprises tech-
niques that maintain program functionality while modifying program instruction sequences,
internal data structures, and other previously static qualities so that the internal software
state is no longer deterministic relative to input [33]. For example, software diversity on
a given network involves deploying multiple versions of an executable, each version hold-
ing different vulnerabilities, to minimize the spreading of an attack exploiting any one of
them [6]. Although some portion of the individual hosts may still fall victim, the overall
network is better protected [6]. One of the more interesting conclusions found in researching
this example technique was that even diversity of the diversity implementation itself was
important in maintaining the defensive advantage as any predictability in how software
versions were deployed eased attacker progress [69]. Thirteen unique examples of this type
of dynamic movement are currently in circulation [6].
In the category of dynamic platform, changes are made to the operating system, virtual
machine instance, or other low-level environmental factors [33]. For example, ESCAPE
is a proposed MTD architecture that migrates docker containers around different hosts to
complicate attack [70]. In simulation, ESCAPE improved the survival probability for a
single targeted container moved around 20 hosts to above 90% in a scenario where, without
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ESCAPE in place, the survival probability was less than 5%. Eighteen unique examples
of dynamic platform exist [6]. These techniques impact the access and development attack
phases [6].
Dynamic runtime environment efforts impact the development and launch phases. The 31
cataloged examples [6] seek to create memory address space randomization and instruction
set randomization to thwart exploitation of software vulnerabilities [33]. As an exemplar,
buffer overflow attacks are thwarted when address space layout permutation complicates
attacker ability to predict where a pointer will land in the heap or stack [6].
In addition to these discussions of the effectiveness of MTD, overhead is also a mechanism
by which techniques can be classified. There are various factors at play: initial investment
costs to obtain or modify hardware or software; investment in human capital to ensure
sufficient expertise is on hand to implement and operate; and per-event overhead related to
system downtime, memory use, or network traffic incurred each time the reconfiguration
is triggered [6]. Often, these factors are assessed on a rubric because of a lack of detail in
available technique specifications [6].
Developing metrics of MTD effectiveness [38], evaluating composability [38], and quanti-
fying overhead [8] are critical and active fields of research, necessary before MTD matures
beyond individual craft techniques to a formally understood scientific discipline [38].
2.3 Decision Making Under Uncertainty via POMDP
MTD implementation involves a series of decisions related to timing, degree, and detail
of defense employment. The system we propose requires a mechanism for automating and
optimizing such decisions, and MDP offers such a mechanism [21]. Given that attacker
progress and intention are difficult to perfectly detect or discern, Markov-based models
suited for problems with state uncertainty become particularly attractive. In fact, hidden
Markov models are a dominant tool applied in more than 30% of discrete cybersecurity
forecasting models [65].
For systems requiring handling for both sequential decision making and persistent state
uncertainty, POMDPs emerge as the dominant technique applied [71]. POMDPs are
best known in the field of operations research where they have been in circulation for
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decades [23]. POMDPs have gained wider traction recently via new solution techniques
that accommodate high dimensionality [72]. In this case, dimensionality refers to the prod-
uct of the quantities of states, actions, and observations incorporated in the model.
POMDP can be thought of as a description of the process diagrammed in Figure 2.2. The
process has two inputs: time-series of states s(t) = s j, s j ∈ s, a discrete random variable;
and time-series of actions a(t) = ai, ai ∈ a, which is user selected and thus deterministic.







Figure 2.2. In this functional diagram of a POMDP, given a random starting
state s(t) and user selected action a(t), the components Pi and Oi of the
POMDP describe the probability with which s(t +1) and ω(t +1) occur con-
ditioned on a(t) = ai, while component Ci dictates c(t+1), the deterministic
cost incurred in this time step. Values in blue are hidden from the user.
The output of the first stage is s(t + 1), which is a discrete random variable drawn from the
state transition probability defined as
Pr[s(t + 1) = sk |s(t) = s j, a(t) = ai] = pi, j,k (2.1)
where the notation Pr[x = y |z] represents the probability that x = y conditioned on z. The
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Any single row j of Pi represents the probabilitymass function describing the state transition
probabilities from s j conditioned on action ai, and thus
∑n
k=1 pi, j,k = 1.
The true state s(t) is hidden from the user for all t. Instead, the user receives partial
information about s(t + 1) via the observation ω(t + 1), which is a discrete random variable
that behaves according to
Pr[ω(t + 1) = ωk |s(t + 1) = s j, a(t) = ai] = oi, j,k (2.2)
where the set of all possible values for oi, j,k are contained in observation probability matrix
Oi. Matrix Oi is of the form
Oi =

oi,1,1 oi,1,2 ... oi,1,n





oi,n,1 oi,n,2 ... oi,n,n

where any single row k of Oi is a probability mass function describing the likelihood of an
observation occurrence in s j conditioned on action ai. It follows that
∑n
k=1 oi, j,k = 1.
Additionally, s(t + 1) and a(t) result in deterministic output c(t + 1) according to the cost
matrix Ci defined as
Ci =

ci,1,1 ci,1,2 ... ci,1,n





ci,n,1 ci,n,2 ... ci,n,n

where ci, j,k is the cost incurred for transitioning between states s j and sk under action ai.
The components of a POMDP are listed in Table 2.3. The n possible system states are
represented by state vector s while the m available actions are contained in action vector a.
Partial observations of state are drawn from a set of k options inω. The system stochastically
moves among states according to the conditional probabilities in transition probability
matrix Pi with elements pi, j,k following Equation 2.1. Rewards or costs are generated by this
state transition according to Ci where ci, j,k represents the reward (+) or cost (−) of taking
action ai in s j and landing in sk . Observations occur as a result of state change according
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to the conditional probabilities in Oi with elements oi,k,m following Equation 2.2. The final
component γ is used to balance future and immediate rewards, with γ = 0 putting complete
emphasis on immediate rewards, and γ = 1 representing no discount such that rewards
retain their full value across all horizons.
Table 2.3. Generic POMDP component formulation
Component Description Size
state vector s all possible system states 1 × n
action vector a available actions 1 × m
observation vector ω all possible observations 1 × k
state transition probability matrix Pi likelihood system transitions between
any two states under ai,
combining m Pi together,
P = {P1, P2, ..., Pm}
n × n
cost matrix Ci cost (−) or reward (+) for moving
between states under ai,
combining m Ci together,
C = {C1,C2, ...,Cm}
n × n
observation probability matrix Oi likelihood of observation by
state under action ai,
combining m Oi together,
O = {O1,O2, ...,Om}
n × k
discount factor γ factor balancing immediate
and future rewards, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
scalar
To use a POMDP to facilitate optimal decision making, an agent is required that can be
decomposed into two sub-agents: (1) a state estimator and (2) a policy [22].
2.3.1 State Estimation
The state estimator uses the model to create a belief state b(t) representing the estimate of
current state given ω(t) and a(t). Depending on the dimensionality of the POMDP, this can
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be done either via a Bayesian belief update or via particle methods [24]. Either way, b(t)
expresses the complete state-observation-action history in a compact form the policy can
use for decision making.
When the Bayesian belief update is employed, belief b(t) is a vector of length n. The vector
is a probability mass function describing system state and takes the form
b(t) = [b1(t), b2(t), ..., bn(t)]
where b j(t) is the probability that the system is in state s j at time t. Each member of the
vector is obtained recursively via
b j(t) = ξoi, j,m
n∑
k=1
pi,k, j bk(t − 1) (2.3)














j=1 b j(t) = 1 in accordance with the law of total probability [24].
Belief b(t) enables the state estimator to maintain a more accurate assessment of true state
than would be afforded based on observations alone, which in turn facilitates higher quality
decision making. For example, we found that using arg max[b(t)] to estimate state rather
than ω(t) consistently improved the accuracy of state estimate by approximately u = 29%.
The improvement in state estimate u was calculated as
u =
(
1 − Pr[ω(t) = s(t)]
1 − pD
−




where probability of detection pD describes the likelihood that state and observation agree.
We explored the value of u in simulation over the range of 0.76 ≤ pD ≤ 1.00 for the proposed
system under validation conditions that will be described in Chapter 7. A comparison of
the accuracy of arg max[b(t)] and ω(t) from the same simulation is depicted in Figure 2.3,
where Pr[arg max[b(t)] = s(t)] > Pr[ω(t) = s(t)] across all test cases.
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a= [ω(t) = s(t)]
a= [argmax[b(t)] = s(t)]
pD
Figure 2.3. The belief state b(t) maintains a more accurate estimate of true
state than ω(t).
For systems of significant complexity, b(t) changes from a probability mass function to
a particle representation of state estimate updated via a particle filter [24]. Our proposed
system will employ a direct Bayesian update in accordance with Equation 2.3, but particle
techniques are considered a path for future expansion of the complexity the proposed system
can incorporate.
2.3.2 Policy
The policy describes the action that maximizes expected rewards or minimizes expected
costs given b(t). Under complete observability such that s ≡ ω and Oi is an identity matrix
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the system collapses to an MDP wherein a static policy Π is represented as a
vector of size 1 × n indicating the appropriate action to take in each state. The value VΠ of
the policy is found according to
VΠ = β(0)(In − γPΠ)−1CΠ
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where b(0) is the vector of initial state probabilities, and PΠ and CΠ are matrices built from
P and C such that pπ,i, j = pΠ(i),i, j and cπ,i, j = cΠ(i),i, j [21]. The optimal policy can be found
by searching through all mn possible permutations of state-action pairing to identify the
pairing that maximizesV . Search efficiency is gained via dynamic programming techniques
including value and policy iteration [21].
For POMDP, expected value must be projected over the range of belief states, rather than
discrete state-action pairings. The efficient offline options for developing a static b(t) ↔ a(t)
mapping for problems with low dimensionality are well summarized by [22] and [73].
For problems with high dimensionality, online solution techniques are needed [26]. The
“curses” of dimensionality and history render the policy otherwise intractable [24]. To
ensure relevance in complex real-world applications, the proposed system employs online
solution techniques.
In particular, online solutions of the POMCP family are well suited [31]. Although not the
first algorithm to extend Monte-Carlo planning to POMDP [74], POMCP uses a tree search
process to efficiently update both the policy decision and the belief state enabling effective
and efficient decisions in POMDP that were previously computationally intractable [26]. For
example, for a model with approximately 250,000 finite states, POMCP achieved the same
performance, measured in average reward earned, as the state-of-the-art offline technique
but used just four seconds of online computation as compared to the 1,000 seconds required
by the offline method [26].
Building on the success of POMCP, new algorithms further increase efficiency by reducing
the number of simulations while still achieving near-optimal decisions. One such advance-
ment is DESPOT, which reduces the number of simulations necessary to achieve optimal
decision by randomly selecting a subset of all possible future trajectories [24]. The algorithm
has been published via [24] and also made available as part of the Approximate POMDP
Planning Toolkit [75]. In experiments, DESPOT has been shown to improve upon the
worst-case behavior of POMCP while providing comparably rapid and optimal results [24].
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, when incoming observations are received and translated into
b(t), simulations are conducted to explore cost incurred in various futures. The volume of
simulations is controlled by a particle count q, which each simulation projecting one possible
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future to a user-selected horizon d. Each horizon is described by a randomly selected action
and observation where the action is drawn from a with each member having an equal
likelihood, while the observation is drawn from ω according to P and O and the selected
action. If each horizon considered the m available actions and k possible observations,
the complete simulation tree would contain mdnd nodes [24]. To improve computational
performance, DESPOT explores a determinized sparse subset of the nodes in the complete
tree as prescribed by particle count q that the user selects based on a tolerance for sub-
optimal decision making [24]. When collected together, the set of q simulations overlay into
an approximation of the complete tree with some observations removed [24].
In a single simulation, after d is reached, the costs encountered at each horizon are added
to the previous horizon discounted by γ, propagating all the way back to the root. As such,





where the subscripts of ci, j,k are annotated by the ′ symbol to clarify that these are the actions
and observations from this specific simulation history, rather than from the observation
stream or action selection occurring in the operational environment.
The next action a(t) is identified via the branch with the lowest expected cost when all q
simulation costs are added together weighted by likelihood. This is why the illustration uses
a heavy dot to represent a(t) selection occurring one horizon beneath the root node. The








Figure 2.4. With an online POMDP policy, once incoming observation ω(t)
is received and used to update b(t), simulations are conducted to identify
the optimal action a(t) that minimizes expected cost.
The key parameters for DESPOT decision quality are particle count q and depth d. Perfect
optimality in the infinite horizon is achieved as q→∞, d →∞, but sufficient optimality is
possible at much more manageable values [24].
2.4 Absorbing Markov Chains
Our model uses an absorbing Markov chain to model cyber attacks. This section outlines
notation and properties of absorbing Markov chains useful in describing the proposed
system. In an absorbing Markov chain, there is at least one absorbing state si from which
the system cannot exit, i.e., Pr[s(t + 1) = si |s(t) = si] = 1.0. The remaining states are called
transient states.
In modeling cyber attacks, we model attacker goal state sn as an absorbing state for two
reasons. First, this state represents the ultimate attacker goal, which once attained remains
satisfied until intervention by the defender guarantees removal of the attacker to restore the
system [34]. Such attack recovery efforts are variable and manual processes that can take
weeks to resolve [76], putting them on a different time scale than the attacks represented
in our model, which occur in matter of minutes [17]. We also found that adopting an
absorbing state improved the ability of the proposed system to work as designed in ramping
up defensive efforts as attack becomes imminent. This aspect will be described in Chapter
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3.
The fundamentals of absorbing Markov chains described in [20] are restated here in the
notation adopted throughout this dissertation. The standard form of Pi, a single member of







where Qi is the (n − 1) × (n − 1) upper left partition of Pi, partition Rn−1 is the (n − 1) × 1
vector of absorption probabilities by starting state taken from column n of Pi, and 0n−1 is a
1 × (n − 1) zero vector [20].
The fundamental matrix N of an absorbing Markov chain is defined as
N = (In−1 −Qi)−1 (2.6)
and contains the expected number of transient state visits before absorption under ai, with
ni, j indicating the expected visits to s j if the system starts in si [20]. The matrix In−1 is an
identity matrix of size (n − 1) × (n − 1).
Given b(0), a 1 × (n) vector of initial state probabilities, we define β(0) as the first n −
1 elements of b(0), i.e., the partition describing initial transient state probabilities. The
expected transitions before absorption τ follow as
τ = β(0)Niζ (2.7)
where ζ is an (n − 1) × 1 vector of ones [20].






where Ndg = N ◦ In−1 and Nsq = N ◦ N [20]. The operator ◦ represents the Hadamard or
element-wise product.
Thus, many of the properties of system operation are available via analysis of Pi. To make
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such analysis possible for the proposed system, we extend these formulations to include
weighting factors for P and Q that account for impacts of partial observability and the
history of actions. These extensions are described in Chapters 3 and 6.
2.5 Summary
This chapter summarized the background material necessary for describing our proposed
system and the ways in which it implements manageable, effective MTD. With this scaf-
folding in place, the next chapters describe our proposed system.
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CHAPTER 3:
POMDP-based Moving Target Defense Scheme
We propose a novel method of harnessing the advantages of moving target defense while
controlling the overhead. Ourmoth-inspired approach scalesMTD in proportion to the prox-
imity of the threat. The method employs less costly defense available in early attack phases
and ramps up tomore expensive options when justified by imminent attack accomplishment.
The proposed system takes advantage of the following facts and assumptions that were
supported in Chapter 2. First, cyber attacks have distinct phases that build up to an exploit
ultimately compromising a device [16]. Reaching each phase requires attacker activity that
is at least partially observable by the defender [51]. Also, for the family of MTD techniques
that carry a per-event overhead, reducing the frequency of reconfiguration occurrences
reduces the overall overhead expended for defense and thus makes MTD more manageable.
The structure of the problem facilitates leveraging POMDP to combine all influences into a
single framework that identifies the optimal MTD at a given point in time to achieve attack
suppression for the lowest long-term cost. This chapter details the model at the core of this
solution and offers an overview of how the proposed system employs that model.
3.1 POMDP Model Specification
The POMDP model is the core of the proposed system. Thus, the description of the system
must begin by outlining how the cyber attack-defense process is abstracted into the model.
This section introduces a POMDP formulation that supportsMTDoptimization. The generic
model components introduced in Chapter 2 are now defined within an MTD context as
summarized in Table 3.1. POMDP was selected because it facilitates optimal decision
making even under persistent state uncertainty [71], which will be the case for cyber
defense applications in which attacker progress is not perfectly known by the defender.
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Table 3.1. POMDP formulation for model of MTD dynamics
Component Description Size
state vector s list of attack phases 1 × n
action vector a list of MTD 1 × m
observation vector ω list of IDS indications (s = ω) 1 × n
transition probability matrix Pi likelihood that system transitions
between attack phases under
MTD ai,combining m Pi together,
P = {P1, P2, ..., Pm}
n × n
cost matrix Ci overhead (−) incurred for moving
between any two phases under MTD ai,
combining m Ci together,
C = {C1,C2, ...,Cm}
n × n
observation probability matrix Oi likelihood IDS indication aligns with
attack phase under MTD ai,
combining m Oi together,
O = {O1,O2, ...,Om}
n × n
discount factor γ factor balancing immediate
defensive overhead with
long term attack penalties,
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
scalar
The state vector s is a discrete list of the n phases of a cyber attack as
s = [s1, s2, ..., sn].
State s1 is the earliest phase of the attack, and sn represents the ultimate attack goal. The
intermediate states represent incremental progress toward sn and can be described in a
multitude of ways including those described in Section 2.1.1. Although intermediate phases
of the attack may be skipped, phases are ordered from 1 to n such that the imminence of
attack can be inferred by state index.
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The action set a is the discrete list of m available MTD as
a = [a1, a2, ..., am].
The first in the list, a1, represents the nil option in which the defender takes no action at all.
The remaining m−1 options are what the defender has available to thwart the attacker. It can
be helpful, though not necessary, to order the defenses by either effectiveness in thwarting
the attacker or overhead incurred for use. We have kept to this convention, so that am is the
most effective defense available to the defender.
The observation set ω is the discrete list of possible observations that could be received
from the upstream IDS. For the proposed system, the burden of processing myriad attack
indicators lies with the IDS such that possible observations are drawn from the possible
attack phases, i.e., s ≡ ω. As such, there are n members in ω.
The state transition probability set P contains a set of m state transition probability matrices,
with individual member Pi describing the state transition probabilities under MTD ai. The
matrix component pi, j,k describes the probability that the attack progresses to sk from s j
if MTD ai is employed. Each Pi proscribes a Markov chain unto itself as shown in Figure
3.1. Given the convention we adopt in which a1 describes the nil option, P1 describes the



















Figure 3.1. A Markov chain with transition probability matrix Pi describes
the system dynamics under action ai.
The cost setC containsm cost matrices, with cost matrixCi describing the overhead incurred
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under MTD ai. Individual matrix component ci, j,k is the specific cost incurred if the system
transitions from s j to sk under MTD ai. To facilitate optimization as intended, the costs
must represent both attack penalties and the overhead of MTD. The attack penalty catk is
prevented so long as s(t) , sn. MTD overhead is treated as independent of attack phase
such that it can be considered a constant of ci for s j ∈ s, sk ∈ s. Thus any individual element
ci, j,k can be found as
ci, j,k =

ci j < n
ci + catk j = n
.
We define cde f as a 1 × m vector of defensive costs ci to succinctly describe the MTD
overhead by itself.
The defender has partial observability of attack phase. The characteristics of this partial
observability are captured in observation set O that contains m observation probability
matrices denoted by Oi that contain the likelihood of alignment between ω(t) and s(t). We
introduce the general form of O to facilitate consideration of the way individual defenses
may improve or degrade the ability to discern true system state but restrict our work to
consider defense and observation processes independent such that Oi = O j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m.
Finally, a discount factor γ is required to establish the desired balance between immediate
and future costs. This scalar value will fall between 0 and 1. Lower values place more em-
phasis on immediate costs, with future costs becoming increasingly influential proportional
to γ until γ = 1 when all costs carry the same emphasis [22].
Together, the components {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ} form the POMDP integral to our proposed
system. The goal of formulating the attack-defense dynamics in this way is to facilitate cost
exploration. From the model, the user can identify the optimal a(t).
3.2 Absorbing State to Represent Attack Goal
In the early stages of developing this system, we envisioned a model capable of representing
the complete dynamics of the attack-defense interaction, all the way through recovery.
Recovery is represented in all but one of the POMDP-based works discussed in Chapter
2. For example, recovery is represented by a stochastic return to an uncompromised state
following initiation of a reset action in [32]. We found, however, that including the recovery
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process within the POMDP was problematic for two reasons.
First, recovery is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately represent as a stochastic process.
Once an exploit lands on a device, recovery involves a variable manual process dependent
on the nature and extent of the damage. It can take weeks to fully recover [76]. Second, in
initial exploration of online solution techniques for POMDP, we found that inclusion of the
recovery process in the model led to undesirable a1 (nil) action selection in the high-risk
states closest to sn. Just when defenses were needed most, they failed to deploy.
To overcome both of these issues, we adopt an absorbing state at sn such that
pi,n,n = 1.0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
An illustration of the influence of the absorbing state is presented in Figure 3.2. These box
plots contain the projected costs of all possible discounted futures when either a nil or def
action is taken in the next time step. In both scenarios (a) and (b), the system is currently
in the penultimate state sn−1. Also, in both scenarios, p2,(1,...,n−1),1 = 1.0 such that selecting
action a2:def returns the system to safety. In scenario (a), the model includes recovery such
that pi,n,1 = 1.0. In scenario (b), attack recovery is not possible as attack is an absorbing




































Figure 3.2. In an illustrative case with recovery in place (a), the attack
penalty and defensive costs are within 60 cost units. Under identical pa-
rameters other than the addition of the absorbing state (b), the distance
increases ten-fold, reducing the difficulty of discerning the optimal action.
The optimal decision in either scenario is the one that minimizes cost, keeping it closest to
zero. In both cases, def is the better choice, indicated by the def box plots being closest to
zero, but the wider spread between nil and def costs in scenario (b) sets better conditions
for the simulation-based approach used in online POMDP solution techniques to select the
optimal decision.
This POMDP formulation with the absorbing end state is similar to the goal attack states
in [31], with a key difference: in our model, revisiting lower numbered states is permissible
from any state except sn while the model in [31] assumes monotonicity in that even interme-
diate phases toward attack accomplishment cannot be reverted once achieved. Because our
system is focused on optimizing MTD, the monotonicity assumption no longer holds [10].
MTD introduces uncertainty for attackers with the intent of forcing them to revisit earlier
attack phases. Thus, developing a model incorporating potential for backward state transi-
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tions right up until the system enters sn is an important contribution toward model-based
control for MTD.
3.3 System Overview
The proposed system, illustrated in Figure 3.3, uses the incoming observation stream ω(t)
to produce an outgoing MTD stream a(t) matched to the assessed threat. For the family
of MTD techniques that carry a per-event overhead such that reducing the frequency of
reconfiguration occurrences reduces the overhead expended for defense, the proposed system
thus sets the conditions for optimal system defense wherein attacks are thwarted for the
minimal overhead.
Within the system, the necessary tasks to produce a(t) are divided between three subsystems.
These subsystems are the POMDP formulation subsystem, the MTD selection subsystem,
and the performance monitoring scheme. Each is explored in more detail in Chapters 4


















Figure 3.3. The proposed MTD scheme determines the optimal action to
take each time an observation is received based on a POMDP formulated
from training data. The POMDP is reformulated when performance metrics
vary from the values expected.
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3.3.1 POMDP Formulation Subsystem
At initialization, the POMDP formulation subsystem quantifies the values of each compo-
nent of the POMDP described in Section 3.1. Together, {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ} represent the
stochastic interplay between the attacker and defender. Overall system performance is highly
dependent on the accuracy of the POMDP in terms of how closely aligned with the actual
attack-defense dynamics it represents. As such, POMDP formulation requires historical data
on cyber attacks, activity trends for the defended system, and technical specification of each
available defense.
Attack analysis, defense analysis, prioritization of competing requirements, and an assess-
ment of the upstream IDS turn the available data into {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ}. The most useful
formulation is tailored to the context in which the proposed system exists so that the resultant
POMDP captures the most relevant threats, options, and priorities.
Once the components have been developed, the POMDP is used by both the MTD sub-
system and the performance monitoring scheme. The MTD subsystem employs the model
to optimally implement MTD while the performance monitoring scheme uses it to trigger
reformulation when required. In preparation for reformulation, the acquisition of historical
data and other supporting information should be considered a continuous processes that
also leverages knowledge gained via operation of the proposed system. More details on the
POMDP formulation system are provided in Chapter 4.
3.3.2 MTD Selection Subsystem
The MTD selection subsystem uses the POMDP and incoming partial observation stream
ω(t) to identify the optimal action a(t). Although the notation is aligned with a sense of
time, ω(t)may be time- or event-driven, but a(t) is always event-driven in that a new action
is selected every time a new observation is received.
Action selection is via the DESPOT algorithm described in Chapter 2, which conducts
simulations to identify the MTD leading to the lowest expected discounted cost. Because
the system is built under the assumption that the IDS is imperfect, and thus ω(t) is only a
partial observation of true state s(t), decisions rely on belief state b(t) derived via a Bayesian
update of the previous belief state b(t − 1) via Equation 2.3.
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In this way, actions remain near-optimal even as flawed observations are received. Based on
the cost-benefit analysis achieved via DESPOT, early phases of attack are met with low or
no cost actions. As the attacker progresses toward sn, more significant defensive overhead
becomes justified to match more imminent attack risk. More detail regarding the MTD
subsystem is provided in Chapter 5.
3.3.3 Performance Monitoring Scheme
The performance of the proposed system is entirely dependent on the effectiveness with
which we have abstracted true attack-defense dynamics in the operational environment into
the POMDP model. For brevity, we will refer to this consideration as model effectiveness
throughout this dissertation. If the model is ineffective, the system will fail to initiate
defenses optimally. At best, defenses will be used more frequently than necessary, causing
excessive overhead. At worst, the attacker will have an easier time pushing the system into
sn.
Because model effectiveness is so important, the proposed system includes a performance
monitoring scheme that flags anomalous system trends to facilitate corrective action via
POMDP reformulation. The scheme tracks fω, the frequency with which each member
of ω is received; fa, the frequency with which each member of a is initiated; and χ, the
average per-decision overhead. These measured values are compared to what would be
expected under perfect model effectiveness. Details of how expected metrics f ∗ω , f ∗a and χ∗
are developed from {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ} are provided in Chapter 6.
The expected metrics (indicated by superscript ∗) are transformed into error quantities by
tracking the average distance between actual and expected values. The error metric ε is
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Error in χ, εχ is quantified as
εχ = (χ − χ
∗)
2 . (3.3)
Collectively, these errors form ε = [εω, εa, εχ], a 1 × 3 vector of error metrics. The errors
εω, εa, and εχ are compared to error thresholds, respectively, represented as a 1 × 3 vector




1 ε > δ
0 else
wherein reformulation begins when E(t) = 1.
This scheme is critical to attaining and maintaining confidence in the system as proposed
because the attack-defense interplay is ever evolving. The monitor of model effectiveness
facilitates rapid corrective action to ensure the model-based system remains useful. Re-
formulation is also indicated when the system enters sn to understand the nature of the
successful attack to improve performance before resuming operation.
3.4 System Performance Metrics
Quantifying the value of the proposed system requires two metrics: average per-decision
overhead, χ, and attack suppression φ. We define average per-decision defensive overhead
χ as the sum of the incurred overhead averaged over the number of decisions that have been







where ci(x) is the vector containing the overhead incurred by the system by the decision at
step x.
We define attack suppression φ of the system by comparing τ, the expected number of state
transitions before the system enters sn, to the expected number of transitions before sn if no
defenses are in place. The actual value τ comes from observing the system in action, while
the undefended value is found from static analysis of the attack dynamics described by P1.
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Thus, we label the undefended number τ1, which can be found
τ1 = β(0)(In−1 −Q1)−1ζ
where Q1, β(0), In−1, and ζ are defined according to the convention analysis of absorbing
Markov chains introduced in Chapter 2. If the defended system is attacked at step τ, we
would have expected x = ττ1 attacks to have occurred by step τ in the undefended system.






By substituting x = ττ1 , we express φ directly from τ as




We generally multiply by φ by 100% to express as a percentage. These two metrics will be
applied in Chapter 7 to validate the utility of the proposed system.
3.5 Summary
This chapter introduced our solution approach for implementing MTD that is both effective
and manageable. We propose a system that uses partial observations of attack phase to
optimizeMTDselection and timing, reducing the overall number of reconfigurationswithout
reducing attack suppression capability. The next chapters explore each subsystem in more
detail.
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Thefirst step in implementing themodel-based optimization scheme proposed is formulating
themodel at its backbone. This chapter explores the steps of POMDP formulation introduced
in Chapter 3. Model formulation occurs at initialization and re-occurs as required by the
performance monitoring scheme.
We selected POMDP because it accommodates all facets of attack-defense dynamics in-
cluding the probability with which MTD thwarts attacks by phase and the persistent state
uncertainty related to incomplete observation of attacker activity and intention. The POMDP
components {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ} are defined as listed in Table 3.1.
These components are derived from manual analysis of all available data related to attack,
operation, and defense of the protected system. Examples include forensics from attacks
against this and other systems, system specifications and requirements, and traffic analysis
of the protected system. Deriving the components can be broken up into four channels of
analysis as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The next sections give more insight into each channel.

















Figure 4.1. POMDP formulation subsystem
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4.1 Attack Analysis
The goal of attack analysis is to identify s, ω, and P1 conducive to achieving MTD opti-
mization. Cyber attacks occur in discrete stages as discussed in Chapter 2. In our model,
these attack stages become the states of theMarkov chain illustrated in Figure 3.1. While the
model can have as few as two states, achieving our stated design goals requires inclusion of
the intermediate attack phases that MTD is designed to impact. Thus, sources for selecting
the states of a model include both attack forensics and MTD specifications.
The next step is to determine a transition basis for the system in question. Event-based
examples include per-connection, per-session, or per-IDS-alert. Time-based transitions are
also possible.
Next, we leverage attack forensics to define the probabilities with which an attacker moves
between states. To be most powerful, these probabilities should be derived from forensic
analysis of attacks against similar targets, but that information can be hard to obtain. In its
absence, the insight available from ethical hackers and expert cybersecurity practitioners
must be leveraged. Examples of the types of published resources useful for this process
include cyber threat intelligence reports such as those from Mandiant [77], cybersecurity
industry white papers like those sponsored by International BusinessMachine [2] or Verizon
[78], U.S. government accountability reports [3], and academic research papers [17].
Generically, the Markov chain is fully connected to capture the attacker ability to skip, loiter
in, and revisit states. All together, the probabilities are gathered in P1, the first member
of P. The only exception to full connectivity is sn, as the final state is absorbing, i.e.,
p1,n,n = 1.0, in accordance with the discussion in Chapter 3. The other probabilities are
estimated from occurrence counts in data of past attacks against similar devices. We step
through an example of this process in Chapter 7.
In our system, the observation set ω ≡ s. The upstream intrusion detection system carries
the burden of collating various indications of attack activity into an assessed attack phase.




The next step in POMDP formulation is an assessment of the available defenses to determine
a, P2,...,m, and cde f . The catalog of available defenses constitute a, a 1 × m vector, keeping
in mind that the first of these defenses is a non-action labeled the nil defense. The transition
probabilities under defense ai are represented as Pi.
The specific values in Pi for 1 < i ≤ m require careful consideration of the phase-impact of
defense ai. The literature offers the starting point, as surveys of MTD including [6] provide
qualitative considerations of the phase-impact of more than 90MTD techniques. Translating
these broad assessments to a specific transition probability requires consideration of the
technical descriptions of the defense in context of the attack model developed during attack
analysis.
It is most useful to define Pi as a function of P1. This dependency permits rapid update of
P after any change in P1 so that the system can stay in step as attack patterns change. Many
MTD techniques follow the general form of alternating some facet of the system among a
set of choices. Thus, the reconfiguration involves rotating some facet of the device among
k versions. A version may be re-selected in the reconfiguration process such that there
is probability of failure p f = 1k wherein no change occurs from the attacker perspective
and thus the defense fails to impede progress. The complimentary probability ps = k−1k
represents the likelihood that the defense succeeds. For an MTD that returns the system
to s1 with probability of success ps, the remaining transition probabilities can be found as
p f × P1. This process of developing Pi is depicted in Figure 4.2 and must be repeated for
































Figure 4.2. An MTD ai that returns the system to s1 with ps is represented
by a Markov chain with transition probabilities Pi defined in reference to P1.
Defense analysis also involves quantifying the overhead ci incurred when ai occurs. In
particular, the overhead must relate to the goals of the optimization effort. For example,
if the optimization goal is to suppress attacks while minimizing downtime of services, Ci
should reflect the downtime for deploying reconfiguration ai. In general, one-time overhead
expenses such as those required for installation do not translate into the proposed approach
andmust be accounted for separately.Whenmultiple cost factors matter for the optimization
goals, they must be scaled and combined into a single value that reflects the prioritization
of each. For the purposes of describing the proposed system, we discuss cost in terms of
availability because it offers a tangible and objective basis for comparison. Thus, ci carries
a unit of seconds to express the down time incurred when ai is deployed. Costs are imposed
as negative values so that the most expensive defense carries the minimum ci. The defense
analysis concludes once Pi and ci have been developed for every member in a.
4.3 Prioritization of Attack Prevention
Next, we translate tolerance for attack risk and defensive overhead into the model by
formulating C to reflect the relative prioritization between these competing goals. The cost
set C contains the m matrices, with matrix Ci indicating the total overhead incurred if action
ai is taken in a given state, resulting in landing in another state.
In the most generic case, Ci is of size n × n to reflect the differences in cost when taking
ai in any state and landing in any another. Few defensive costs are state-dependent, so in
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practice Ci frequently contains repeated entries of scalar action cost ci with the exception
of the final row, which is where the attack penalty catk is added to ci to penalize the system
for entering sn.
As discussed in Chapter 2, POMDP-based systems achieve optimization by identifying the
action that will maximize discounted expected rewards (or minimize discounted expected
costs) in the infinite horizon. Costs are imposed as negative values such that the most
expensive defense corresponds with the minimum value in cost vector cde f . Thus, catk is
defined relative to this defense as
catk = νmin[cde f ] (4.1)
in which we define ν as the attack penalty scaling factor. The prioritization of attack
suppression over the optimization factors is thus directly proportional to ν. The defender
must find ν such that attacks are thwarted at an acceptable cost.
This balance is achieved by considering the tipping points in ν that result in changes in
the optimal policy of an MDP-equivalent system. MDP systems can be solved for optimal
policies via dynamic programming techniques as described in Chapter 2. As ν increases,
preventing attack becomes increasingly influential in minimizing the cost of a given policy
until it becomes the only influential factor.
At that point, the system will conduct expensive but effective reconfigurations regardless
of attack phase. Meanwhile, as ν decreases, the defensive costs become more influential in
the overall value determination until ν is so low that defenses are skipped in the interest
of minimizing cost even when attack is imminent. Analysis of optimal MDP policies over
a range of ν values will identify up to n × m points for which ν drives a change in policy
as more expensive but effective defenses are used in increasingly more attack stages as ν
increases.
These shifts are illustrated for a generic system in Figure 4.3, which contains a plot of
the states with given action applied as a function of attack penalty scaling factor ν. Under
the assumption that cost and effectiveness are directly proportional such that the defense
with the least overhead is also the least adept at thwarting attacks, at ν = 0, there is no
attack penalty applied, and thus the most inexpensive action is applied in all n states. At
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the other end of the spectrum when ν = ∞, attack is weighted so heavily that the action
with the most significant cost and effectiveness is applied in all n states. Given the interest
in optimization prerequisite for considering the proposed system, the defender seeks to
identify ν in the mid-range of values such that the most expensive defenses are used only in


























Figure 4.3. As ν increases, the proportion of states using the most aggressive
defenses increases until the tipping point when aggressive, repeated defense
overrides any effort to implement optimization.
The discount factor γ influences the priority of immediate versus future rewards, with
the minimum value 0 resulting in future overhead being ignored, and maximum value 1
considering all horizons of equal importance. We have conducted our analysis at values
in the range 0.75 ≤ γ ≤ 0.95 to reflect the importance of attack suppression while still
imposing cost control measures.
4.4 IDS Assessment
The final component of POMDP formulation involves assessment of the upstream IDS to
determine the probability of detection pD, i.e., the probability that ω(t) and s(t) align. From
there, assessment must be made to determine where the error, 1 − pD falls by state. These
values are collected into the observation probability matrix Oi, which is n × n in size and
reflects the probability of receiving observation x in state y conditioned on action ai as
oi,x,y.
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With the IDS upstream of the proposed system, the IDS performance specifications begin
the assessment that will end at O. The pD as well as the probabilities of false alarm pF A and
missed detection pM must be determined, usually from tests of the IDS under conditions
in which attack activity is well understood. While there are many uncertainty conditions
{U1,U2,U3, ...} possible, our work explores the performance of the proposed system under
three conditions of the form
Oi =

pD pF A ... 0 0






0 ... pM pD pF A
0 0 ... pM pD

(4.2)
in which pF A and pM are restricted to the immediate neighboring states.
4.5 Summary
This chapter explored the four assessments that must occur during POMDP formulation. The
complete model {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ} is relayed to both the performance monitoring scheme
and the MTD subsystem. The next two chapters will detail how each of these subsystems
employ the model to achieve the overall objective of overhead minimization for an MTD
scheme.
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CHAPTER 5:
Moving Target Defense Selection
This chapter describes the processes that occur within the MTD selection subsystem. When
an observation is received, the system leverages the POMDP to simulate the impact of
each possible action to determine that which is most beneficial. A detailed view of this
subprocess is shown in Figure 5.1. The sections in this chapter describe the Bayesian belief















Figure 5.1. MTD selection subsystem. This process occurs every time an
observation is received and results in an optimal action being taken.
Because the state of the system is only partially observable, the system takes action based
on the belief state vector b(t) rather than the true state s(t). Vector b(t) is developed via
Bayesian belief update in accordance with Equation 2.3, and element bi(t) is the probability
that the system is in state si at time t. Thus, b(t) represents attack phase as a probability
mass function over s. At initialization, b(0) = [1, 0, 0, ..., 0] to represent the assumption that
the system is not yet compromised when the cyber defense system is implemented.
5.1 Control Parameters
Once b(t) is determined, the next step uses the DESPOT algorithm to identify the optimal
action. As described in Chapter 2, DESPOT is both a software [75] and algorithm [24] that
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uses simulation to identify the optimal defensive action. This section describes the selection
of the control parameters for DESPOT as well as its role in selecting the next action.
The key parameters that control the quality of DESPOT decisions are particle volume q and
simulation depth d as a sufficient number of trees must be explored to a sufficient horizon
to ensure optimality is achieved [24].
Identifying these parameters is an optimization effort in itself, particularly to select d such
that the priorities of optimization are enforced. The undefended system dynamics are used
to do so because of the compounding attack penalties that occur once the system reaches sn.
The key system metric toward determining d is τ1, the expected number of state transitions
before the system is compromised if no defensive action is taken, found from Q1, the
partition of P1 as defined in Equation 2.5. The steps before absorption without defense τ1
follow Equation 2.7 and fundamental matrix absent defense N1 follows Equation 2.6.
To facilitate discussion, the collection of all simulations exploring for the optimal action can
be thought of as a tree, with each individual action-observation simulation history flowing
from the tree root out to a branch. Within this visualization, the nil branch describes the
branch of the tree with a series of d repeated selections of a1 have been implemented. This
branch is expected to enter sn at horizon τ1, which results in the system suffering from
the attack penalty, regardless of action, for every subsequent horizon. The expected cost c
incurred at each node following entry to sn is thus catk .
To determine the expected cost of the next decision, the expected cost at each subsequent
node is propagated back down the tree toward the root, discounted by γ before being added
to the next horizon in accordance with Equation 2.4. For the nil branch, by definition
ca(i),ω(i−1),ω′(i) =

0 i < d








α d ≥ τ1.
(5.1)
Only the a1 sequence is expected to be attacked by τ1, as defenses a2 through am are more
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effective at thwarting attacks than a1. Thus, we can assume no other sampled scenarios
include the attack penalty by horizon τ1 and thus the most significant expected cost of any
other simulation branch c′min reflects sequential use of the most expensive reconfiguration
such that ca(i),ω(i−1),ω′(i) = min[cde f ] for 1 ≤ i ≤ d, which when substituted into Equation
2.4 leads to an expected branch cost of




where min[cde f ] represents the value in vector cde f with the greatest magnitude, as all costs
are imposed as negative values. By convention, this is also the cost of action am.
When c′nil ≥ c
′
min, a1 is not viable even in low numbered states, which subverts the cost
minimization design goal for this system. Thus, we seek to select control parameter d to
prevent this condition from occurring.
Beginning from desired endstate c′nil > c
′
min, and substituting in the definitions of either
value from Equations 5.1 and 5.2, we find that
νγτ1−1 min[cde f ]
d−τ1∑
α=0

















1−r when r , 1 [79]. Replacing the summations
on either side with their equivalent expressions following this form and multiplying either
side by (1 − γ), we find that
νγτ1−1(1 − γd−τ1+1) > (1 − γd+1)
so long as 0 ≤ γ < 1. Distributing the ν term on the left side before grouping all γ terms
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together on the left, it follows that
νγτ1−1 − νγd + γd+1 > 1.
Recall that attack penalty scaling factor ν must be significant enough to express the attack
risk tolerance of the defender. In practice it is usually many orders of magnitude greater
than γ such that this expression can be expressed with significant terms only as
νγτ1−1 > νγd .
Taking the logarithm of either side after dividing by ν, we can see a boundary for parameter
d exists at d < τ1 − 1. Abiding by this expression will help achieve the desired cost
minimization by keeping a1 viable in low-risk states.
With d selected, selection of q is next. In theory, the error between the value of the true
optimal policy and the policy derived viaDESPOTbecomes arbitrarily small as q→∞ [24].
However, computation time to exhaust all q scenarios through a depth of d increases with
q, so in practice q is selected to achieve quality decisions within an acceptable time frame,
which is dependent on the hardware employed by the system. We discuss the determination
of this value for the specific hardware used in simulating the proposed system in Chapter 7.
5.2 Action Selection
With the control parameters established, DESPOT identifies the optimal MTD response to
incoming belief state b(t), which is ingested into DESPOT as part of an extensible markup
language file that also includes full specification of POMDPcomponents {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ}.
A sample file is included as Appendix D.
DESPOT translates b(t) into representative set of 256 particles from which q particles are
selected as the first node, or root, in the trees DESPOT will explore. Each of the q scenarios
are overlaid into a single tree that explores the costs of action-sequences projected from the
initial node out to a length of d. The trees explore every possible action sequence but only a
subset of the possible observation sequences to improve the computational efficiency with
which DESPOT selects the next defense [24].
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Since the goal of this exploration is to identify the optimal action, costs are averaged by
likelihood over all scenarios that contain ai as the next action. These costs will include the
overhead of the defenses used in the scenario as well as the attack penalty for those scenarios
in which ωn occurs. The next action a(t) is selected as that which has the lowest expected
discounted cost. Once selected, the action is implemented and also relayed to the Bayesian
belief update module and performance monitoring scheme.
As an example, we explore this process for a system with n = 2, m = 2, q = 6, and d = 1
where b(t) = [0.5, 0.5]. In practice, parameters n,m, q, and d are significantly larger, but this
small illustration is useful in tracing the decision process. The trees used for exploration are
illustrated in Figure 5.2. In this case, there are 2 × 2 × 2 = 8 possible scenarios, but given
that q = 6, scenarios s2a1s1 and s2a2s1 are not included in consideration. In this particular
simplistic case, elimination of these scenarios is ideal as p1,2,1 = p2,2,1 = 0.0 and thus
neither is possible. There are a variety of other paths to determining the subset of scenarios




s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2
a1 a2 a1 a2
Figure 5.2. DESPOT trees for determining next action when b(t) = [0.5, 0.5]
in the proposed system given n = 2, m = 2, q = 6, and d = 1.
The expected cost incurred at each of the eight nodes is compiled in Table 5.1 to illustrate
how the MTD with the lowest expected overall cost is identified. In this case, we follow the
convention of the proposed system in that catk is only incurred in sn = s2 and c1 = 0. Also,
the absorbing state dictates that pi,2,2 = 1.0 for all i.
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Table 5.1. Projected costs of each scenario in Figure 5.2.
scenario progression c Pr[scenario]
1 s1a1s1 0 b1p1,1,1
2 s1a1s2 catk b1p1,1,2
3 s1a2s1 c2 b1p2,1,1
4 s1a2s2 c2 + catk b1p2,1,2
5 s2a1s2 catk b2p1,2,2
6 s2a2s2 c2 + catk b2p2,2,2
The expected cost of taking a1 can be defined by conditional expectation
E[c |a1] = b1
(










. The other option carries an expected cost
of
E[c |a2] = b1(c2 · p2,1,1 + (c2 + catk) · p2,1,2) + b2
(
(catk + c2) · p1,2,2
)
which simplifies to E[c |a2] = 0.5c2
(
p2,1,1 + catk p2,1,2
)
+0.5(catk+c2). The proposed system
select the action with the largest expected value, which is also the value closest to 0 given
that both defensive overhead and attack penalties are expressed in the cost matrices in C as
negative values.
5.3 Summary
Received observations are translated into optimal defensive action by the MTD selection
subsystem. These results are also relayed to the performance monitoring scheme to ensure
the POMDP remains an accurate and thus effective tool for defense optimization. This
chapter explained the details of the MTD selection subsystem. The next chapter describes




This chapter details the performancemonitoring scheme that triggers POMDP reformulation
when there are indications of poor model effectiveness or completed attack. Recall that we
define model effectiveness as the measure of howwell true operational conditions have been
abstracted into the model. The subsystem is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The following sections
describe how the expected performance metrics (indicated by superscript ∗) are obtained
and how threshold vector δ are identified for comparing these expected metrics to the actual
values.
Expected metrics frequency of observation f ∗ω , frequency of action f ∗a , and overhead per
action χ∗ are ideal for two reasons. First, measuring the actual values is a straightforward
process as all three metrics are available to the defender. Second, all three metrics stabilize
to consistent values shortly after system initialization. Not all metrics support real-time
tracking of performance, with the most obvious negative example being attack suppression.
Although an important metric, attack suppression cannot be accurately measured until after
















Figure 6.1. The performance monitoring scheme compares real-time metrics
to expected values and sets E(t) = 1 when POMDP reformulation is required.
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6.1 Expected System Performance Metrics
The system requires expected values of each metric under perfect model effectiveness. It is
possible to predict these metrics by applying absorbing Markov chain theory and POMDP
theory under the assumptions and within the structure of our model. These assumptions
and structural qualities include a single absorbing state sn, 1:1 correspondence between
state and observation spaces (s ≡ ω), defensive overhead that is independent of state,
and neighboring uncertainty as defined in Section 4.4. We developed these equations with
support from empirical analysis of each quality in simulated operation of the system, which
assisted in identifying how to combine absorbing Markov chain and POMDP theory.
Assuming perfect observability, the POMDP formulation collapses to a Markov decision
process (MDP) that can be solved using dynamic programming to identify an optimal, static
policy vector π that prescribes actions by state [21]. Optimal state transition probability
matrix PΠ is an n × n matrix compiled row-wise from P such that pπi, j = pπ(i),i, j .






to describe expected state transition probability as the sum of state transition probabilities
under any action, weighted by action and observation likelihood under optimal system
operation.
This resultant transition probabilitymatrix P∗ is a powerful tool in predicting how the system
will perform. In particular we lean on the description of the transient state transitions in
partition Q∗. In accordance with the background on absorbing Markov chains contained in
Chapter 2, Q∗ reveals the expected number of state visits before attack as given by
N∗0 = (In−1 −Q
∗)−1
where In−1 is an identity matrix of size n − 1. Because we assume that the proposed system
is in s1 when it is first brought online, the first row of N∗0 provides the expected number of
visits to each state before entering sn (i.e., before an attack succeeds). The sum of this row is
τ∗, the number of total state transitions before attack such that the expected state frequency
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Assuming observations are independent of action selection, the expected observation visit
frequency f ∗ω is defined as
f ∗ω = f
∗
s O. (6.2)
We also define expected attack suppression as




Though φ∗ is not used as a real-time performance correction metric, it is useful in analysis
of how well we expect a specific POMDP formulation to meet design objectives.
The expected action visit frequencies f ∗a can also be determined from the optimal policy
Π and f ∗s , but the impact of the partial observability is reflected, so the calculation of f ∗a
requires a permutation ofO in which pM and pF A are swapped, abbreviatedO
′. This formula
was developed from assessment of empirical data from the validation scenario detailed in
Chapter 7. The calculation also requiresΠ, an m×nmatrix representation of theMDP-based
policy vector π wherein
Πi, j =

1 π( j) == i
0 otherwise
.
A single row of the matrix Π is denoted as Πm and is used to define the number of expected










The expected overhead per action is defined via the dot product
χ∗ = f ∗a · cde f (6.5)
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where cde f is the overhead vector described in Chapter 3.
6.2 Setting Thresholds
The error between the model and the real world is identified by assessing the agreement
between the expected and the actual values in each of the three metrics, calculated as in
Equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Thresholds for these errors are necessary to identify when
POMDP reformulation should occur. The general guidelines for threshold determination
are illustrated in the context of the validation scenario thoroughly explored in Chapter 7.
The performance monitoring scheme is intended to identify the existence of errors in C, P,
and O, though error classification does not occur. Errors in s and ω are not handled by the
performance monitoring scheme. Given that a is set by the defenses implemented by the
defender, errors in a are not considered possible.
Threshold determination begins by identifying trends in error vector ε using simulation of
system operation under ideal conditions in which O = In and perfect model effectiveness
exists. In this case, fω, fa, and χ stabilize near the expected values within approximately
200 decisions, helping to support their utility in quickly identifying model errors. This is
equivalent to approximately 30 minutes of system operation assuming a connection inter-
arrival time of 10 seconds. This rapid stabilization is displayed in Figures 6.2, 6.3, and
6.4. In each figure, the x-axis represents the number of decisions since initialization while
the y-axis represents a single member of set of values averaged to calculate fω, fa, and χ,
respectively. The blue lines are the expected value for each member, following Equations
6.2, 6.4, and 6.5, while the black lines are the actual values recorded from the simulation.
All three errors approach the expected value following initial fluctuation and align closely
by action index 200.
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Figure 6.2. Frequency of observation fω stabilizes within approximately 200
decisions.
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Figure 6.3. Frequency of action fa stabilizes within approximately 200 deci-
sions.
As might be expected, similar rapid stabilization occurs in all three members of error vector
ε as displayed in Figure 6.5. Determination of threshold vector δ requires the trade off
analysis between false alarm and missed detection inherent in anomaly detection schemes.
Depending on the shape of the underlying probability mass function for each variable, mean
and standard deviation or median and quantile offer starting places toward tailored threshold
determination for a particular application. For illustration, the performance monitoring
scheme applies thresholds at the 75th percentile of each metric at the 750th action across
100 simulated runs of the proposed system under perfect model effectiveness.
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Figure 6.4. Accumulated overhead per action χ stabilizes within approxi-
mately 200 decisions.



























Figure 6.5. Error metrics in ε stabilize within the first 200 decisions under
ideal conditions. In this example, δ is set at the 75th percentile across 100
ideal trials.
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6.3 Detection of Attack
While there may be indications of completed attacks from outside of the proposed system,
the performance monitoring scheme will also provide an indication that attack end state sn
has been reached as ε will approach εatk , a predictable error vector, once the system enters
sn.
The first element εatk,ω of error vector εatk is constrained by the fact that fω and εω are
calculated across the n − 1 transient states only. As such, once the system enters sn and the
repeated observations of ωn arrive, limt→∞ fω,i(t) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Substituting this








The action metric εa also reaches a predictable value. Once in sn, only a1 will be viable, as
the absorbing state ensures the other actions incur overhead for no gain. Thus, the action





1 m = 1
0 m > 1
which when substituted into Equation 3.2 results in the definition of εatk,a as
εatk,a =








Similarly, εatk, χ can be defined based on Equation 3.3 as
εatk, χ = (χ
∗)
2
because χ(t) = 0 once s(t) = sn.
In supporting these definitions, we looked at the agreement between εatk and ε in the
validation scenario for 30 trials in which the system was fully compromised at t = 500 such
that s(t) = sn for t ≥ 500.
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As displayed in Figure 6.6, ε approaches εatk gradually over approximately 9,000 decisions.
Thus, this is an effective means of detecting attack, though it is not rapid. Under the
conditions of the simulation, 9,000 decisions equates to approximately 25 hours of time.
Direct use of observations of ωn is a more rapid indication of having entered sn.


























Figure 6.6. The performance monitoring scheme provides indications of at-
tack as ε → εatk . In these trials, s(t) = sn for t > 500.
6.4 Examples of Error Detection
From error vector ε and threshold vector δ, the system is capable of detecting errors in
model components C, O, and P. This section describes the characteristics of ε in each case.
6.4.1 Error in C
Error in C is caused by an incorrect assessment of defensive cost measures and will be
apparent if εo < δo, εa < δa, but εχ > δχ. An example of the metrics under this error is
displayed in Figure 6.7. Because the defenses are completely controlled by the defender,
this error is straightforward in that POMDP reformulation requires an update of C with the
values observed in system operation.
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Figure 6.7. The performance monitor detects error in C as εo < δo, εa < δa,
but εχ > δχ.
6.4.2 Error in O or P
This section looks at errors in IDS or attack analysis that result in errors in O and P. Such
errors impact all three components of ε . This overlap hinders classification of error source
for these cases.
Error in P can be of two types. The first type, error in P1, stems from an inaccurate
understanding of the attacker. To look at the impact of such an error, we imposed an error
ranging from [−0.06, 0.2] on p1,i,i, the probability that the system remains in a given state at
the next transition, with error displaced to p1,i,i+1. We then tracked the error metric across
100 trials of 750 decisions each. The median, 25th, and 75th percentiles of each error metric
taken at the 750th decision across 100 trials under each error condition are displayed in
Figure 6.8. There is a tolerance of around 0.05 in either direction before the thresholds are


































Figure 6.8. Error metrics in ε increase proportional to the absolute value of
errors in p1,i,i.
Error in Pi for i > 1 can also stem from an inaccurate understanding of effectiveness of ai in
thwarting attack progress. The timeliness of detecting such errors is related to the frequency
with which ai occurs as it must be selected often enough to influence ε . Thus, infrequently
used actions should be validated via other means.
Error in O results from incorrect assessment of the upstream IDS. To review the impact
of this error, we conducted simulation of the system operating with error in pD in the
range [0, 0.2], again looking at ε across 100 trials of 750 decisions each. These results are
displayed in Figure 6.9 and are similar to those from the P1 error investigation, as ε increases
proportional to the error. Again, the system exhibits an error tolerance of approximately
0.05 before the thresholds are broken.
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Figure 6.9. Error metrics in ε increase proportional to errors in pD.
6.4.3 Other Model Errors
Errors in s and ω are possible if the phases of attack are different than those determined
during attack analysis. These errors are likely to observed via εω. Addition of extra members
in s and ω would result in those states and observations never being visited or received.
Omission of members of either set would result in the system loitering in phases longer
than might be expected as some additional intermediate activity occurs that the system is
not capable of monitoring.
6.5 Summary
The performance monitoring scheme is unique to our proposed system as compared to
the other POMDP-based cyber defense systems in the literature. Identifying a process by
which model error can be detected encourages reliance on model-based defensive systems
as corrective action can be taken well ahead of catastrophe. This chapter concludes the
discussion of our solution approach. The next chapter validates the proposed approach by




This chapter examines how the proposed system would defend against a five-stage attack
by optimally choosing between three actions. We first describe how the proposed system
was implemented for validation purposes and present results from simulation of that im-
plementation. Next, we compare our system to a state-of-the-art MTD system in which
reconfigurations occur pseudo-randomly with exponentially distributed inter-arrival times.
Finally, we explore how the proposed system performs under conditions of model error. Pre-
liminary analysis of the proposed system under this validation context was detailed in [80];
the discussion in this chapter expands on those initial findings.
7.1 System Implementation
The phased attack model studied in validation is illustrated in Figure 7.1. The attack has
five phases, i.e., |s | = 5 in which states {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} correspond to the progression from
start to attacked. This attack model aligns with the five-phase attack described in Chapter
2 with the following adjustments: First, a start phase is added to describe the defended
system before attack activity begins. Further, we assume that development has occurred
out of sequence so that the attacker has an exploit packaged and ready to launch when the
attack begins and thus leave this phase out of the model. We selected this progression for
validation of the proposed system because it was also used to study the effectiveness and














Figure 7.1. Five phase attack process used for validation of proposed system
In start s1 no attacker is yet working against the system. Next, target scan s2 aligns with the
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reconnaissance phase described in Chapter 2 and represents the initial efforts performed by
the attacker to locate the system. An example of this type of activity is an internet control
message protocol (ICMP) ping sweep used by an attacker to identify all hosts in range of
network addresses. If the system enters this phase, activity has been detected that indicates
an attacker has located the system. The next phase is vulnerability scan s3 representing
reconnaissance efforts meant to identify particular vulnerabilities of the protected system,
such as might be found via the network mapping tool NMAP [42]. This phase aligns with
the access phase described in Chapter 2. Finally, in launch s4 the attacker actually attempts
a compromise. If successful, the compromise results in the protected system entering the
attacked state s5 which aligns with the description of the persistence phase described in
Chapter 2.
7.1.1 POMDP Formulation
This section steps through how each of the parameters {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ} were formulated
during validation of the proposed system.We used objective analysis of forensic attack data,
defense specification, and performance requirements to the maximum extent possible.
Attack Analysis
The attack model illustrated in Figure 7.1 was used to define s, which is the first step of
attack analysis. We sought published data from real-world attacks from which P1 could be
formulated. We translated honeypot data into a Markov chain modeling attacker dynamics.
The data used are from [17] and were collected over 48-days as attackers interacted with
two honeypot web servers behind a university firewall.
The authors of [17] categorized activity as one of four different events based on a count of
packets-per-connection as specified in Table 7.1. These classificationswere possible because
the honeypots served no true function, and thus there was no valid reason to communicate
with them. Two protocols were identified in traffic, namely ICMP and transmission control
protocol (TCP). All ICMP traffic was assumed to be scanning activity, regardless of packet
volume. The TCP traffic was of three types: the lowest volume connections are identified as
port scans, intermediate volume as vulnerability scans, and high volume as launches. The
specific thresholds between categories were established by studying the traffic pattern of
well-known methods of performing each function.
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Table 7.1. Attack stage by packets-per-connection, from [17].
Event Packets per connection Protocol
ICMP Scan N/A ICMP
Port Scan < 5 TCP
Vuln. Scan 5 − 12 TCP
Launch > 12 TCP
Over the 48 days, 59,468 connections were collected, 22,710 of which went to the two
honeypots. Of those honeypot connections, 6,203 unique records occurred, representing
5,540 individual attacks. Each attack progression occurred with the counts listed in Table
7.2. A four digit binary value represents the attack progression that from left to right signifies
launch – vulnerability scan – port scan – ICMP scan. For example, 1000 represents an
occurrence of s4 with no indication of earlier scan activity. Although the authors do not
distinguish order of events in cases with more than one type of scan, we assume that
scans always occur in the order ICMP scan – port scan – vulnerability scan given that this
corresponds with an increasing level of detail afforded to the attacker.
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Table 7.2. Occurrences of each attack progressions in which each progression
is comprised of a series of connections. Adapted from: [17].
Progression No. Observed Progression No. Observed
0000 10,807 1000 381
0001 2,796 1001 1
0010 666 1010 28
0011 11 1011 0
0100 1,103 1100 296
0101 179 1101 5
0110 17 1110 42
0111 8 1111 7
Note: Big endian binary values are used to label attack progressions such that
from left to right, values correspond to launch - vulnerability scan - port scan -
ICMP scan with 1 indicating occurrence and 0 the opposite.
To align the available data in [17] with our five state attack model, we combined the two low
fidelity scans into the target scan state. Thus, we combine the values of Table 7.2 into those
displayed in Table 7.3. Now, a three digit binary value represents the attack progression
that from left to right signifies launch - vulnerability scan - target scan. For example, 100
represents detection of a launch with no indication of reconnaissance scans having been
performed.
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Table 7.3. Occurrences of attack progression collapsed to the attack model
in Figure 7.1. Adapted from: [17].
Progression No. Observed Progression No. Observed
000 10,807 100 381
001 3,473 101 29
010 1,103 110 296
011 204 111 54
Note: Big endian binary values are used to label attack progressions such that
from left to right, values correspond to launch - vulnerability scan - target scan
with 1 indicating occurrence and 0 the opposite.
Under the assumption that the attack stages may be skipped but may not occur out of order
from s1 through s5, these observation counts translate into the Markov chain in Figure 7.2
with values from Table 7.4. In calculating these probabilities, we assume that attacks occur
via consecutive connections without intermediate traffic from other sources. We apply a
per-connection basis for state transitions.
p1,1,1
p1,1,2







Figure 7.2. Markov chain of cyber attack process used in validation.
We extended the model to the fifth state to account for the failure of exploits to take effect
and cause damage, which was not measured in [17]. In the presence of layered defense,
p1,4,5 represents the probability of all other defenses (e.g., anti-virus software, privilege
control, security training) failing. For validation, we applied a value of 0.5 to conservatively
represent the likelihood another layer of defense prevents the launch from being successful.
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Table 7.4. Mapping of occurrences observed in [17] into transition probabil-





s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
count p1,i,1 count p1,i,2 count p1,i,3 count p1,i,4 count p1,i,5
s1 16,347 10,807 0.661 3,760 0.23 1,399 0.086 381 0.0230 0 0.0
s2 3,760 0 0.0 3,473 0.924 258 0.069 29 0.008 0 0.0
s3 1,657 0 0.0 0 0.0 1,307 0.789 350 0.211 0 0.0
s4 760 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 380 0.5 380 0.5
s5 380 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 380 1.0
Together, the probabilities form state transition probability matrix
P1 =

0.6611 0.2300 0.0856 0.0233 0
0 0.9235 0.0687 0.0078 0
0 0 0.7900 0.2100 0
0 0 0 0.5000 0.5000
0 0 0 0 1.0000

. (7.1)
As the first member of P, P1 captures a number of qualities of the underlying attack process.
The standard form of P1 follows Equation 2.5 for one absorbing state and n−1 = 4 transient
states so thatQ1 is the upper left partition of the state transition probabilitymatrix comprising
only the transient states. Given the specific values in Equation 7.1, the fundamental matrix
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0.6611 0.2300 0.0856 0.0233
0 0.9235 0.0687 0.0078
0 0 0.7900 0.2100






2.951 8.872 4.105 2
0 13.072 4.276 2
0 0 4.762 2
0 0 0 2

.
We assume that the system begins in s1, i.e., b(0) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0], and thus follow Equation
2.7 to determine that there are an expected τ1 = 17.928 total state visits before reaching
the attacked state. This is a critical metric as it serves as a baseline for quantifying the
improvement in attack suppression of any defensive system installed. Moving into the
simulated operation of the system, we assume that connections arrive every 10 seconds
such that decisions occur at the same rate. Thus, absent defense, the system would be
attacked within approximately 3 minutes.
From Equation 2.8, the variance N2 for attack model P1 is
N2 =

5.7560 144.3593 18.1392 2.0000
0 157.8026 18.1636 2.0000
0 0 17.9138 2.0000
0 0 0 2.0000

.
Comparing Nsq = N ◦ N and N2 provides an indication of the reliability of the means as
estimates for a given Markov chain [20]. For the system in question,
Nsq =

8.7084 78.7124 16.8510 4.0000
0 170.8770 18.2842 4.0000
0 0 22.6766 4.0000




These values are in general agreement with N2 in that all values are of the same order of
magnitude. Thus, N offers reliable estimates of expected performance. However, τ1 and N
are the expectation of variables with long right tailed distributions, so individual samples
can vary significantly from the expected value. The implications are that median will be
more useful than mean in establishing thresholds for the performance monitoring scheme.
To explore this practically for the attack model used in validation, we conducted 100,000
simulated attacks, compiling the spread of state visits across all simulations. The significant
right tail is visible in the values in Table 7.5 and the histograms in Figures 7.3 and 7.4.
Table 7.5. Volume of state visits before absorption into s5 with theoretical
values following Equation 7.1.1.
State
theoretical value
Across 100,000 Simulated Attacks, pD = 1.0
(a) (b)
E[visits] Var[visits] mean var. median max min max min
s1 2.95 5.76 2.96 5.81 2 28 1 2 1
s2 8.87 144.36 8.85 143.26 4 144 0 144 0
s3 4.11 18.14 4.10 18.34 3 49 0 4 0
s4 2.00 2.00 2.01 2.02 2 15 1 1 2
total 17.93 170.25 17.92 173.13 14 236 2 151 3
Note: The max/min values in column (a) are across all data, while those in column (b) are
drawn from a single attack progression.
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Figure 7.3. Occurrence of total transient state visits before absorption over
100,000 simulated attacks, pD = 1.0.
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Figure 7.4. Occurrence of individual state visits before absorption over
100,000 simulated attacks, pD = 1.0.
Defense Analysis
For the validation scenario, we implemented three possible MTD, i.e., |a| = 3. While
there are many more defenses available, both from the catalog of MTD techniques detailed
in [6] and other options like restarting resources or partitioning the network connectivity of
devices under attack, implementing these three defenses for validation facilitated a direct
comparison between our system and the state-of-the-art system detailed in [8].
The first, a1, represents a nil defense in which the system continues to follow attacker whim
as described by P1. The remaining defenses are modeled after real-world MTD strategies
with details drawn from [8]. When effective, each returns the system to s1. Following the
generic pattern depicted in Figure 3.1, a2 represents a dynamic platform change between µ
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µ 0 0 0 0
µ−µv
µ 0 0 0 0
µ−µv
µ 0 0 0 0
µ−µv
µ 0 0 0 0





wherein µv are assumed to be vulnerable to attack.
Similarly, a3 represents a dynamic network change in IP address between ρ available




ρ 0 0 0 0
ρ−1
ρ 0 0 0 0
ρ−1
ρ 0 0 0 0
ρ−1
ρ 0 0 0 0






To alignwith the defenses implemented andmeasured in the laboratory in [8], we implement
a1, a2, and a3 into our model with specifications as recorded in Table 7.6. We measure
overhead in terms of availability such that ci represents the loss in system availability in
seconds when MTD ai is deployed based on experimental values from [8] assuming a 10
second inter-arrival rate between connections.The service reconfiguration a2 is a rotation
between µ = 3 services, wherein µv = 1 is vulnerable to attack and imposes a c2 = 0.635
second loss in availability. The IP address reconfiguration reassigns addresses from a pool
of 256 options and imposes a c3 = 9.590 second loss in availability.
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a1 No Action n/a n/a 0.000 100%
a2 Service µ−µvµ =
2
3 66.7% 0.635 93.7%
a3 IP address ρ−1ρ =
255
256 99.6% 9.590 4.1%
The dynamics under each defense described by P2 and P3 are absorbing Markov chains that
provide insight into the effectiveness of each defense. Following the same flow of analysis
used in Equation 7.1.1, a2 would extend the expected time before attack 15 times over to
τ2 = 105. Certainly a2 is useful, though a3 extends the expected time before attack even
further to τ3 = 5.25 × 106, making it by far the more effective defense but also the most
expensive. System availability under such consistent use of a3 would be just 4.1%. The
other options either thwart the attack moderately well for moderate expense (a2) or not at
all but for free (a1). With these values quantified, the POMDP formulation process pivots
to establishing system priorities.
Prioritization of Competing Requirements
Recalling that attack penalty is set relative to the most expensive defense in accordance
with Equation 4.1, the next step in formulating the POMDP involves selecting the attack
penalty scaling factor ν to reflect the defensive priorities. For the context thus described, the
locations of the policy shifts as ν increases are shown by state in Figure 7.5. The optimal
policy vector πν describes the action that should be taken in each state for a given value of
ν as determined for the equivalent MDP via policy iteration as implemented in [81]. For


















































































































Figure 7.5. Policy shifts as attack penalty scaling factor ν increases. Each
plot represents the optimal action in π in a particular state, from (a) s1 to
(d) s4. The first shift occurs near ν = 100 in (see (a)). By ν = 10, 000 the
optimization effort is effectively abandoned, as the policy indicates taking
the most expensive defense, a3, in every state.
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These two cases represent the policies at either extremewith the former prioritizing overhead
minimization and the latter prioritizing attack suppression. This trade-off is illustrated in
Figure 7.6 wherein the predicted metrics of attack suppression and availability as a function
of attack penalty scaling factor ν are displayed. The stair-step shifts in value align with
the policy shifts by state in Figure 7.5. Even for pD = 0.5, it is possible to achieve attack
suppression of greater than 99%, but not unless the user is willing to accept availability on
the order of 2%. Because the objective of our work is to implement MTD with overhead
minimization, we set ν = 100 to explore system performance in the range in which both
attack suppression and availability are above 90%. The optimal policy in this case is
π100 = [a1, a1, a2, a3, a1], which escalates defensive effort as attack phase progresses in an
echo of our original moth-based inspiration.






























































Figure 7.6. Sensitivity of performance metrics (a) attack suppression and (b)
availability to variation in attack penalty scaling factor ν.
The discount factor γ influences the priority of immediate versus future rewards. The optimal
policy for the system studied in validation is not particularly sensitive to γ as illustrated
in the sensitivity analysis displayed in Figure 7.7, which was developed by calculating
the optimal policy under each γ via policy iteration as implemented in [81]. At γ = 0,
the optimal policy is π = [a1, a1, a1, a2, a1] while at γ = 1.0, π = [a1, a1, a2, a3, a1]. We
selected γ = 0.75 to ensure both long-term attack suppression and near-term availability
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were achieved but could have selected any value in the range 0.34 ≤ γ ≤ 0.99 and achieved
similar balance.




















































































Figure 7.7. Policy shifts across discount factor γ. Each plot represents the
optimal action in π in a particular state, from (a) s1 to (d) s4. Policy vector




Because the intrusion detection system is upstream of the proposed system, our work
explores the performance of the proposed system across a range of capabilities for that
upstream system. We consider intrusion detection system performance to be independent
of the proposed system such that Oi = O j for i, j ∈ [1, ...,m]. We set ω ≡ s and explore
three uncertainty conditions: U1, U2, and U3, all of the form of Equation 4.2 over a range
of probability of detection pD values. In this system, pD measures the likelihood that
s(t) = ω(t).




pD 1 − pD 0 0 0
0 pD 1 − pD 0 0
0 0 pD 1 − pD 0
0 0 0 pD 1 − pD
0 0 0 0 1

.
The next case, U2 considers only missed detection such that
OU2 =

1 0 0 0 0
1 − pD pD 0 0 0
0 1 − pD pD 0 0
0 0 1 − pD pD 0
0 0 0 1 − pD pD

.
The final mixed case U3 considers missed and false detection equally likely such that
OU3 =









0 0 1−pD2 pD
1−pD
2
0 0 0 1 − pD pD

.
Note that our attack analysis assumed that pD = 1.0 for the results in [17] such that the
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reported attack progressions define P1, not O. While it would be possible to consider a
skipped attack phase as a missed detection, rather than a true indication that the attacker
was able to make progress without an intermediate step, we consider our assumption
valid because the data were collected from honeypots specifically tailored for attack-phase
detection and categorization [17].
This section has outlined POMDP formulation and the values of s, a, ω, P, C, O and
γ that are used in the remaining sections of Chapter 7 to explore various aspects of the
proposed system in action. For succinct reference, this POMDP formulation is summarized
in Appendix A.
7.1.2 MTD Selection
In this subsection, we describe the way in which we configured the MTD selection sub-
system so that it effectively operated as POMDP agent. DESPOT parameters were set at
{d, q, z} = {11, 80, 40}. The first parameter, depth d, was set at 11 based on analysis of τ1
as described in Section 5.1. For all simulations, we set z = 40 so that the actual clock time
DESPOT used to perform simulations toward selecting the optimal MTD was limited to 40
seconds. It was necessary to select a value high enough to permit deep exploration without
becoming unreasonable in terms of the memory available on the simulation hardware. The
specifications of the hardware used in validation are provided in Appendix C.
The final parameter, particle count q, was selected by conducting exploratory simulations
of 100 decisions each across a range of values to identify that which would result in optimal
decisions in a majority of cases. The results of these exploratory trials are presented in Table
7.7. At pD = 1.0, the perfect optimal decision is explicitly known as the POMDP collapses
to an MDP that can be solved for an optimal policy. Thus, we calculate a probability of
achieving the optimal decision by comparing 100 DESPOT decisions at each test point to
what was prescribed by the MDP policy vector π = [a1, a1, a2, a3, a1].
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Table 7.7. Impact of particles parameter on probability of achieving optimal
decision via DESPOT, depth = 11, time = 40, pD = 1.0.
state
particle count
20 40 80 160 320 640
s2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.89 0.91
s3 0.79 0.92 0.98 0.99 0.73 0.77
s4 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
The drop off in accuracy with increase in particle count is a result of the inability of the
system to explore all particles out to the designated d for a given z. To stay well back from
this limitation, system trials were conducted at q = 80.
The final parameter test verified that the selected values {11, 80, 40} would sustain quality
decision making as pD degraded. The results of these trials are summarized in Table 7.8.
In these trials, the system began in the indicated state with probability of 1.0, meaning
that partial observability impacted simulations conducted to explore future actions and
observations but not the starting belief state. As indicated, the selected parameters sustained
high-quality decision making through pD = 0.8.
Table 7.8. Impact of pD on probability of achieving optimal decision via
DESPOT, {d, q, z} = {11, 80, 40}
state
pD
1.000 0.975 0.950 0.925 0.900 0.850 0.800
s2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
s3 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96
s4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
7.1.3 Results
With the POMDP model formulated, the next step in validation was to ensure the system
could optimally defend against attack as designed. To test this aspect, we operated the system
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across three uncertainty models as described in Section 7.1.1. In each case and at each pD,
data were collected across a decision volume ηdec = 330, 000 decision cycles, which was
equivalent to attack volume ηatk in the range 36 ≤ ηatk ≤ 235 depending on the success
of the system in thwarting the attacker. Specific trial lengths per data point are recorded in
Table 7.9.
Table 7.9. Attack volume ηatk and decision volume in millions ηdec used to
quantify simulated system performance.
pD
1.0 0.98 0.92 0.86 0.80 0.74
case ηatk ηdec ηatk ηdec ηatk ηdec ηatk ηdec ηatk ηdec ηatk ηdec
U1 100 2.77 58 1.29 40 0.88 68 1.34 69 1.24 90 0.90
U2 100 2.77 36 0.33 91 0.38 132 0.44 137 0.39 195 0.47
U3 100 2.77 56 0.98 93 0.85 135 0.98 184 0.96 235 0.80
Because it offers a mix of missed and false detection, we use U3 to describe the results in
detail from this point forward with additional results from Cases U1 and U2 contained in
Appendix B. These simulations were conducted under conditions of ideal model effective-
ness in that the POMDP formulation detailed in Appendix A was used within the proposed
system and the simulation controller except where noted to explore the implications of
model error.
The proposed system maintained mean availability at above 94% and mean attack suppres-
sion above 99% for 0.76 ≤ pD ≤ 1.00, as depicted in Figures 7.8(a) and 7.8(b) respectively.
For perspective, in the absence of the proposed system, assessment of P1 indicates the system
would be successfully attacked every three minutes. The proposed system prevents enough
inbound attacks to increase this rate to every nine and a half hours, even at pD = 0.76.
Two y-axis scales are included so that Figures 7.8(a)–(b) provide visual reference of perfor-
mance across the range of possible values while Figures 7.8(c)–(d) highlight the difference
between measured metrics and those expected based on Equations 6.3 and 6.5. Although
measured and expected results align exactly at pD = 1.0. As pD decreased, agreement
decreased proportionately. As depicted in Figure 7.8(c)–(d), the system out-performed ex-
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pected attack suppression and under-performed expected availability by a maximum of








































































































Figure 7.8. Availability and attack suppression performance under the pro-
posed system as pD degrades for uncertainty case U3 in which detection error
is split between false alarms and missed detection, i.e., pF A + pM = 1 − pD.
The solid black line indicates predicted performance based on Equations 6.3
and 6.5, while the blue line represents the mean across simulated operation
of the proposed system, with the 0.25 and 0.75 quantile indicated by the
error bars.
These discrepancies between the expected and actual performance metrics are the result of
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sub-optimal action selection by the proposed system. As such, the error is also reflected
in the trends in action selection presented in Figure 7.9. We repeat the use of two y-axis
scales so that Figures 7.9(a)–(c) display results within the range of possible values, while
Figures 7.9(d)–(f) expand the region of interest to display the difference between measured
and expected values. Expected action visit frequency f ∗a is calculated via Equation 6.4. The
tight agreement between expected and simulation results in Figure 7.9(c) indicates a1 is
used optimally even as pD degrades. Sub-optimal decision making is instead resulting in
implementing a3 when a2 would be optimal, as the simulation results for a2 displayed in
Figure 7.9(e) are consistently lower than expected by the same amount that the results in
a3 displayed in Figure 7.9(f) are consistently higher than expected. The proposed system
chooses a3, the most effective and most expensive defense, more than expected as pD de-



































































































Figure 7.9. Action visit trends under proposed system as pD degrades for un-
certainty case U3. The solid black line indicates predicted performance based
on Equation 6.4, while the blue line represents the mean across simulated
operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25 and 0.75 quantile indicated
by the error bars.
Further explaining this sub-optimal decision making requires analysis of qπ, the probability
that action a(t) = π(s(t)), the action indicated by the optimal MDP policy vector in true
state s(t)). Simulation-based measurements of qπ are displayed in Figure 7.10. The dashed
line represents qπ = pD in which case there is no advantage to the POMDP-based system
over an MDP-based system operated under the assumption that the intrusion detection
system is perfect. Overall, as indicated in Figure 7.10, the proposed system outperforms
this benchmark, which validates its utility and design overall but does not explain the
discrepancy between expected and measured performance metrics.
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Figure 7.10. The impact of probability of detection pD on the probability a(t)
aligns with the optimal MDP action qπ. The dashed line represents qπ = pD.
Fine-grained analysis does explain the discrepancy between metrics. Specifically, values of
qπ conditioned on state as plotted in Figure 7.11 indicate that the problematic state is s3. In
s1, s2, and s4, the proposed system does better than the benchmark as displayed in Figures
7.11(a),(b), and (d); however, in s3 far more sub-optimal decisions occur as qπ is up to 0.25
























































Figure 7.11. The impact of probability of detection pD on the probability
a(t) aligns with the optimal MDP action qπ conditioned on state si. The
dashed lines represent qπ = pD.
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The issue in s3 is further explained by the projected value of decisions a2 and a3 in the belief
space around s3. Despite a2 being the optimal action to take in s3, a3 becomes the optimal
decision based on belief state for anything beyond s3. To illustrate, we developed a vector-
based policy for pD = 0.8 via the incremental pruning algorithm [73] as implemented
in pomdp-solve [82]. This policy is depicted in Figure 7.12. Value-vector policies are
used by finding the current belief state along the horizontal axis and taking the action
that corresponds to the vector of maximum value in that location. As an example, at




































Figure 7.12. Value vector representation of the optimal policy for U1, pD =
0.8 as developed by applying the incremental pruning algorithm.
The vector-based policy is consistent in the belief state regions around s1, s2, and s4, which
facilitates optimal decision making in these belief states even as pD degrades. A close
up of the region immediately around s3 is displayed in Figure 7.13. While the optimal
action when b(t) = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0] is a2 as indicated by the yellow line, when the belief state
b(t) = [0, 0, 0.975, 0.025, 0] the optimal action is a3 as indicated by the red line. This means
that optimal decisions when s(t) = s3 require a belief state within just a few hundredths of


























Figure 7.13. Value vector representation of the optimal policy in the range
around b(t) = s3, for U1, pD = 0.8 as developed by applying the incremental
pruning algorithm.
With the threshold vector δ as set and discussed in Section 6.2 using the 75th percentile
across simulations at pD = 1.0, the performance monitoring scheme indicates model ef-
fectiveness for pD > 0.85 as depicted in Figure 7.14. The scheme detects the discussed
departure from optimal action selection via εa for pD < 0.85 as depicted in Figure 7.14(b).
The other two metrics, εω and εχ, remain below threshold throughout the range of pD














































Figure 7.14. Error ε during simulated system operation as pD degrades for
U3.
Although the decision making in s3 is sub-optimal, the system errs on the side of increased
caution on the part of the defender, resulting in greater attack suppression thanwas expected.
Further, because the system spends far more time in the other states in which decisions are
optimal, the sub-optimality in s3 has little impact on the overall optimality of the system
as it loses less than four percentage points in availability from what is expected. Thus, we
consider the proposed system validated in that it performs as designed, implementing MTD
to thwart attackers effectively while minimizing overhead.
7.2 Improvement over a Comparable System
Wecompare the proposed system to an alternativeMTDsystem to quantify the gains possible
under our scheme. In this case, the alternative system is attacker-agnostic and triggers
reconfigurations pseudo-randomly with exponentially distributed inter-arrival times, similar
to the defenderwith the two reconfigurations implemented in our validation systemdescribed
in [8]. We use that as the basis for quantifying theoretical attack suppression and availability
under the state-of-the-art-system. Preliminary results from this analysis were presented
previously [80]. This section offers significant expansion of those early results.
Given the properties of exponential probability distributions, the probability of reconfigu-
ration ai occurring in a given time period t is
ψi = e(−λit)
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given a rate of arrivals per second λi. Both a2 and a3 co-occurring describes a fourth action
a4 not considered in our proposed system, which carries probability
ψ4 = e−t(λ2+λ3).
Consequently, the likelihood of a1 (no action) is defined as
ψ1 = 1 −
(
e(−λ2t) + e(−λ3t) − e−t(λ2+λ3)
)
.
These probabilities are used to define χR, system availability under the state-of-the-art-
system as a sum of availability under each action weighted by their probabilities, i.e.,
χR = ψ1χ1 + (ψ2 − ψ4) χ2 + (ψ3 − ψ4) χ3 + ψ4χ3
assuming that the loss of availability is concurrentwhen both a2 and a3 occur simultaneously.
These probabilities can also be used to define PR, the transition probabilities of a Markov
chain describing attack state under this system by taking a weighted sum as
∑4
i=1 ψiPi where
ψi is the probability that each action occurs. We define matrix P4 to represent state transition
probability given the co-occurrence of both a2 and a3 with each element following
p4,i, j =
p2,i, j p3,i, j∑n
j=1 p2,i, j p3,i, j
.
The state transition probability matrix under the state-of-the-art-system PR is defined as
weighted sum
PR = ψ1P1 + (ψ2 − ψ4) P2 + (ψ3 − ψ4) P3 + ψ4P4,
which describes an absorbing Markov chain and thus defines the attack suppression under
the state-of-the-art-system φR as
φR = 1 −
τ1
τR
where τR is calculated in accordance with Equation 2.7.
By exploring a range of values for λ2 and λ3, it is possible to identify system parameters
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wherein the state-of-the-art-system would match the attack suppression performance of the
proposed system. We calibrated λ2 and λ3 so that φR = φ and χR is maximized. Here, φ
represents the attack suppression under the proposed system over the range 0.74 ≤ pD ≤ 1.0
as developed in Section 7.1.3. The calibration values for λ2 and λ3 and resultant availability
under each case are compiled in Table 7.10.
Table 7.10. Comparison between the proposed system and a state-of-the-art-
system calibrated to match in attack suppression under uncertainty profile
U3.
pD
Proposed System State-of-the-Art System
χ − χR
φ (%) χ (%) λ2 λ3 χR (%)
0.74 99.5 93.7 0.435 0.085 42.4 51.3
0.80 99.7 94.7 0.435 0.105 35.5 59.2
0.86 99.8 95.4 0.450 0.120 31.1 64.3
0.92 99.8 96.4 0.350 0.130 28.5 67.9
0.98 99.9 97.4 0.380 0.165 21.3 76.1
1.00 99.9 97.8 0.445 0.185 18.2 79.6
In all cases, the proposed system maintained greater availability than the state-of-the-art-
system as indicated by the positive percentage point gains displayed in Figure 7.15. The
worst case explored still offered a gain of more than 45 percentage points in availability.
As pD increases, the proposed system gains approach 80 percentage points. These results
underscore the utility of our attack-sensing approach toward cost-controlled MTD.
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Figure 7.15. Percentage point availability gain (χ − χR) under the proposed
system as compared to a comparable state-of-the-art-system calibrated to
match in attack suppression.
7.3 System Performance Under Model Error
We concede that the performance of a model-based defensive system is dependent on the
accuracy of the model, which is why it is important to quantify how the system performs
under such conditions before considering the concept valid. These issues are explored in
this section.
Error is possible in every aspect of the model, which precludes exhaustively testing the
impact of every possible error over the complete range of possible values; however, the
exploration of errors in cost matrix set C, observation probability matrix set O, and state
transition probability matrix set P for the validation model presented in this section supports
the system having acceptable error tolerance and error detection performance across the
most likely and most dangerous error types.
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7.3.1 Error Tolerance
The proposed system was tolerant during testing of small (< 5%) errors in O, P1, and C
with no significant change in availability or attack suppression performance. The summary
of perturbation conditions identified during validation is detailed in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11. Model-error tolerance and impact within the proposed system.
Tolerances presented are specific to the validation study.
Error Source Description Tolerance
Impact
χ φ optimality
Defense Analysis cde f ±0.05 3 3
IDS Assessment pD ±0.05 3 3
Attack Analysis p1,i,i ↔ p1,i,i+1 ±0.20 3 3
Attack Analysis P1 + θPsys θ < 0.33 3 3
Errors in cost matrix set C result from incorrectly measuring overhead of defenses in
determining cde f . Intuitively, under testing, when the values in cde f are larger than the true
overhead of the defenses, the impact is a gain of availability over the expected. If the values
in cde f are too small, availability is reduced. In either case, attack suppression remains the
same. Thus, optimization fails. These results were first introduced in Section 6.1.
Error in observation matrix set O stems from error in pD via incorrect quantification
during analysis of the intrusion detection system. As discussed in Chapter 6, within the
validation model, error of up to 5% in pD is well tolerated with overall system performance
not impacted. The results of simulated operation of the system under flawed pD were
presented in Figure 6.9. Errors in O of up to 5% are well tolerated with ε staying below δ;
however, beyond 5%, system performance degrades requiring improvement in the POMDP
formulation before the system performance goals are achieved. The impact of these errors
on the underlying action selection frequencies fa are displayed in Figure 7.16. The tolerance
in ε of up to 5% is repeated again here as fa remains almost flat at this point. Beyond this
boundary, however, increase in pD error decreased the portion of time that the system fielded
a1. Thus, error in pD resulted in increased overhead but not decreased attack suppression.
The failure is in optimization, not defense. This is a desirable failure mode for this type of
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system.

















Figure 7.16. Frequency of action selection fa begins to change as error in
pD increases beyond 5%.
To test the impact of errors in P1, we analyzed system operation under imposed error
magnitude in the range [−0.2, 0.2] imposed on p1,i,i with the error displaced to p1,i,i+1. Only
the most extreme of valuse in the range result in a change in the optimal policy π found
via Markov decision process theory. Thus, the system is tolerant of errors of this type up
to this level. Attack suppression and availability depart from the expected values because
the underlying dynamics are different, but the system continues to provide optimal attack
suppression and availability.
We also tested the case in which the attacker is more systematic than expected such that
PSY S =

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1




The systematic attacker was added to P1 by an increasing weight factor θ so that the resultant
attack dynamics P′1 follow
P′1 = θPSY S + (1 − θ)P1.
In this case, the optimal policy is stagnant for θ < 0.33, which develops a boundary value
beneath which error of this type is well tolerated by the proposed system under the context
of the validation scenario.
While there are a multitude of potential errors in a model of this complexity, exploration
of the validation model has determined that the proposed system is tolerant of many of the
broad error classes expected.
7.3.2 Error Indication via the Performance Monitoring Scheme
Beyond the boundaries of error tolerance, the performance monitoring scheme was in-
troduced to flag model error as rapidly as possible. Errors are measured during system
operation and compiled into error vector ε = [εω, εa, εχ].
Baseline for ε
First, to establish the validity of these error metrics, we ensured that ε is indeed stable and
close to zero when the system is operating under ideal conditions wherein there is perfect
model effectiveness. Model effectiveness is the measure of how well the POMDP represents
the operational environment. To support our conclusion that these error metrics are valid,
the means and 15th and 85th quantile of each error by step are displayed in Figure 7.17.




































Figure 7.17. Trends in ε over 100 trials of the first 250 decisions under
proposed system, POMDP known to be valid, attacker profile drawn from
[17], pD = 1.0. Used as control in subsequent error tests.
Detection of P1 Error
We reviewed the impact on error metrics when P1 contains significant error, imposed in
two cases. In the first case, attack intensity abruptly changes at step 2000, taking on a far
less aggressive profile following
P′1 = 0.25P1 +

0.75 0 0 0 0
0.75 0 0 0 0
0.75 0 0 0 0
0.75 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.75

(7.2)
In the second case, the attacker abruptly becomes more aggressive after step 2000 following
P′1 = 0.25P1 +

0 0.75 0 0 0
0 0 0.75 0 0
0 0 0 0.75 0
0 0 0 0 0.75




such that the attacker is now 75% more likely to push forward to the next state than is
expected by the system.
Both cases are detected by the performance monitoring scheme as ε increases after either
profile change as depicted in Figure 7.18–7.19 for the less andmore aggressive cases respec-
tively. Thus, these errors would each result in POMDP reformulation. It also appears that
either attacker profile change manifests differently in ε such that model error classification





































Figure 7.18. Trends in ε over 100 trials of the first 6000 decisions under










































Figure 7.19. Trends in ε over 100 trials of the first 6000 decisions under
proposed system, more aggressive attacker profile following Equation 7.3,
pD = 1.0.
Detection of Failed Defenses
Failed defenses manifest in the system as Pi model errors for 1 < i ≤ m. We tested the most
extreme Pi error wherein defenses fail such that Pi ≡ P1. In the first test, the failure was
imposed at initialization. The performance monitoring scheme rapidly detects the issue with
ε failing to approach the expected values as displayed in Figure 7.20. While the detection
is rapid, equally rapid intervention would be required to repair the defenses; otherwise,
attack goal state s5 will be reached within 3 minutes as discussed in Section 7.1.1. Indeed,





































Figure 7.20. Trends in ε over 100 trials of the first 250 decisions under
proposed system, a2 and a3 failure from initialization, attacker profile drawn
from [17], pD = 1.0. The mean is plotted as a solid line, while the 15th and
85th quantile are plotted as dashed lines.
We also tested delayed onset defensive failure that might occur either if there is a technical
glitch in the defense or if the attacker was able to gain enough insight into the mechanism of
MTD as to render it ineffective. In this case, the system operated with model effectiveness
through 2,000 decisions before a2 failed such that P2 ≡ P1. Again, detection is rapid, with






































Figure 7.21. Trends in ε over 100 trials of the first 4000 decisions under
proposed system, a2 failure onset at step 2000, attacker profile drawn from
[17], pD = 1.0. The mean is plotted as solid line, while the 15th and 85th
quantile are plotted as dashed lines.
In all cases, detection of error by the performance monitoring scheme results in a return
to POMDP formulation. The model must be corrected via the same attack and defense
analysis, now informed by the error indications and additional data available relating to
attack and defense dynamics.
7.4 Expanded Dimensionality
The core of our validation study implements a five-state, three-action model with dimen-
sionality of |s | × |ω| × |a| = 75. We also conducted cursory exploration of system per-
formance under conditions of greater dimensionality. Our expanded model contains nine
attack phases, nine corresponding observations, and four actions for a total dimensionality
of |s | × |ω| × |a| = 324.
In this study, our focus was confirming that additional model capacity existed. As such, the
nine-state, four-action model explores a notional attack-defense process because specific
forensic data similar to that levied for the five-state attack model could not be found.
Instead, we consider a systematic attack process that visits nine phases in order moving
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forward one state at each transition such that
P1 =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

.
The nine states represent a more sophisticated attack wherein the attacker strings together
two exploits to reach an ultimate goal. States s1 through s6 represent the preliminary
process exploit a, and s7 through s9 represent a secondary process, exploit b. We established
state transition probabilities and costs under each available defense to ensure that scaling
defensive response to imminence of attack risk was possible while also considering that a
single defense may not disrupt multiple exploit processes.
Defense a2 is low cost, but also of limited utility, analogous to a TCP connection reset
or similar simple reconnaissance disruption. Once the attacker completes the first exploit
process, a2 becomes obsolete. It carries an overhead of c2 = −0.1 and returns the attacker
to s1 with ps = 0.5. The next defense a3 carries a cost of c3 = −1 and is effective in states s3
through s8, returning the attacker to s3 with ps = 0.7 to reset the foothold gained by exploit
a. The final option a4 carries a cost of c4 = −10 and impacts states s7 and s8 disrupting the
success of the launch of exploit b. This defense returns the system to s7 with ps = 0.9.
The parameters applied for each defense are complied in Table 7.12. Additionally, we
list availability and attack suppression in Table 7.12. Attack suppression was calculated
assuming defense ai is used alone and repetitively as though operating with policy vector
π = [ai, ai, ..., ai].
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a1 no action n/a n/a 0.0 0.00%
a2 reconnaissance disruption 0.5 s1 : s6 -0.1 87.69%
a3 exploit a disruption 0.7 s3 : s8 -1.0 97.35%
a4 exploit b disruption 0.9 s7 : s8 -10.0 93.10%
We apply attack penalty scaling factor ν = 100 such that catk = −1000.We simulated system
operation under γ = 0.75 over 10 trials lasting 6,000 decisions each per test point. Test points
were under uncertainty model U3 at pD = [0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 1.0]. Based on analysis
of P1, we implemented the MTD selection subsystem with parameters computational time
z = 10, particle count q = 100, and depth d = 8.
The proposed system accomplished better than 94% attack suppression while maintaining
an overhead-per-decision of better than -0.9 even at pD = 0.80. Additionally, performance
in simulation came within 5% of the expected attack suppression and 0.7 of the expected
overhead-per-decision. Expected metrics were determined via Equations 6.3 and 6.5, re-
spectively. Attack suppression performance at each test point is compiled in Table 7.13
while overhead-per-decision is presented in Table 7.14.
At this dimensionality, the equivalent MDP has nm = 94 possible policy vectors ranging in
discounted expected total value from a low of −400 to a high of −0.64. This latter value is
exhibited by the true optimal policy vector π, but there is a tight cluster of 32 near-optimal
policies with discounted total values within 0.50 of that for π. Every simulated decision
delivered by the proposed system came fromwithin this tight cluster of near-optimal policies,
but only a handful came from the true optimal policy that is used to determine the expected
metrics. The proposed system was unable to distinguish the true optimal decision from the
near-optimal neighbors, which is why the proposed system under-performed the expected
metrics in this scenario.
Driving these near-optimal decisions closer to alignment with π and thus achieving perfor-
105
mance nearer to the expected metrics is possible by adjusting MTD subsystem parameters
z, q, and d as these parameters control a trade-off between computational investment and
optimality of each decision [24]. Still, the delivery of consistently near-optimal decisions
under the expanded model validates that excess capacity is available. The proposed sys-
tem can be used to deliver overhead minimization for an MTD system even as POMDP
dimensionality increases.
Table 7.13. Attack suppression (%) under the expanded model
pD
1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80
Expected 99.85 99.78 99.71 99.64 99.57
Mean 99.00 96.73 96.83 96.26 94.98
Minimum 97.31 85.19 85.45 81.82 86.44
Maximum 99.86 99.81 99.78 99.80 99.69
Table 7.14. Overhead-per-decision under the expanded model
pD
1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80
Expected -0.1537 -0.1558 -0.1579 -0.1602 -0.1627
Mean -0.3305 -0.5216 -0.4114 -0.4113 -0.8967
Minimum -0.7477 -1.1964 -0.6353 -0.6760 -2.1567
Maximum -0.2058 -0.2269 -0.1333 -0.1280 -0.1716
Although this exploration involved a deterministic cyber attack process and notional de-
fenses, the model is four times greater in dimensionality than the model used to conduct
our core research. As such, these results confirm that there is significant room for expansion
of state, observation, and action spaces in the POMDP at the core of the proposed system.
Handling more complex attacks with a greater variety of defensive techniques is possible.
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7.5 Summary
This chapter has validated the proposed system through simulation in a realistic attack-
defense context. The system provided optimal defense against a five stage attack via MTD.
We have provided evidence that the system performs as designed and offers significant
availability improvement over a comparable MTD system for the same attack suppression.
We have also explored system performance in the presence of model error, both identifying
tolerances below which the error is of little concern and providing examples of how errors
would be detected to facilitate POMDP reformulation. Finally, we have confirmed that
the system will be able to expand to incorporate more complex attack models and greater
libraries of MTD techniques.
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In this dissertation, we proposed and validated a mechanism by which MTD could be im-
plemented optimally so that it is both effective in creating an unpredictable attack surface
and manageable from the defensive perspective. We have identified and validated the com-
ponents necessary to facilitate system operations and developed metrics for predicting and
assessing performance. We have also leveraged those metrics for performance monitoring
to prevent model error from leading to system failure.
We conducted our research through formulation of a stochastic model of attack-defense
dynamics as a POMDP. We then conducted analysis of the properties of the model so that
it could be applied to facilitate autonomous selection of MTD. From there, we developed a
simulation of the proposed system and explored performance under ideal conditions before
imposing various errors to determine how robust the proposed architecture is to both state
and model uncertainty within the POMDP.We also conducted comparative analysis against
a state-of-the-art MTD system to quantify the gains possible under the proposed system
and confirmed that model expansion to consider more complex attack models and greater
libraries of MTD techniques is possible.
Our results support the conclusion that the proposed system delivers effective attack sup-
pression and overhead minimization within constraints of intrusion detection and model
effectiveness. We put forth new best-practices for model formulation in support of optimal
MTD and support POMDP in particular as a path for achieving MTD that is both effective
and resource-conscious in thwarting attackers.
8.1 Contributions
Our results make several contributions toward more optimal and thus adoptable MTD. The
key contributions relate to the formulation of POMDP for triggering defenses as needed
and the development of a performance monitoring scheme to improve system performance.
We have demonstrated the utility of POMDP formulation as an objective basis by which
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MTD effectiveness and overhead can be studied and is particularly useful in such analysis for
systems where multiple MTD techniques are used in combination. The developed formula-
tion is useful for the family of MTD that incur per-reconfiguration overhead, facilitating the
trade-off analysis necessary to implement MTD so that cost and benefit are balanced. Our
work has expanded the understanding of best practices for model formulation in support of
MTD optimization. Examples include adopting attack models with intermediate phases rep-
resented and defining the impact of defenses as a function of the underlying attack model to
permit rapid update to the system as attack patterns change. In addition to permitting static
analysis of attack-defense dynamics, the model formulation drives autonomous optimal
decision making within our proposed system.
We have also described a technique for scaling defenses to the proximity of threat via the
combination of an absorbing Markov chain, an attack penalty scaled by defensive overhead,
and depth limitations within Monte Carlo planning. The absorbing Markov chain and attack
penalty ensure that most effective actions are selected in higher indexed states when attack
risk justifies overhead expenditure. Meanwhile, the depth limitation ensures less costly and
less effective defenses are viable in lower indexed states when attack is not imminent.
Our simulations have vetted the proposed system to determine best practices under realistic
scenarios. The proposed system thwarted 99% of inbound attacks, which changes the
rate of successful attacks from every three minutes to every 9.5 hours, all while sustaining
system availability at greater than 94%.A comparable system that triggered reconfigurations
randomly maintained just 43% availability in achieving this same attack suppression rate,
which illustrates the utility of optimizing MTD in the way we have proposed.
Finally, we have combined elements from absorbing Markov chain and POMDP theory
to facilitate predictive analysis of system performance under ideal and error conditions as
part of a performance monitoring scheme unique in the field of POMDP-based cybersecu-
rity controllers. For similar systems with an absorbing ultimate state sn, state-observation
alignment, observations independent of action selection, and neighboring uncertainty, the
equations defined in Section 6.1 flag model error in time for corrective action, which is an
important stride toward confident adoption of a model-based defensive system.
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8.2 Future work
These contributions are poised for expansion in a few directions. The next steps relate to
reducing the amount of manual analysis necessary to operate the system, expanding the
complexity incorporated into the POMDP, and working toward practical adoptability.
8.2.1 Automated Model Updates
It would be useful to introduce automation into formulation and fine-tuning of the POMDP.
Currently the system handles state uncertainty autonomously but only flags model un-
certainty. Under conditions of state uncertainty, the exact state at any given observation
point is not perfectly known while under model uncertainty, components including state
transition probabilities, observation probability, and defensive costs are not certain [71].
Bayes-adaptive POMDP [83] may be the answer. In this case, after a starting guess, model
parameters are updated via reinforcement learning techniques to adapt to the changing
environment. Work has been conducted to develop reinforcement learning techniques in
combination with POMDP to facilitate optimal decision making when both state and model
uncertainty exist [74], [84] that may be a good fit for the proposed system.
Another path to increasing automation in POMDP formulation would be to incorporate
error classification into the performance monitoring scheme. As currently designed, the
system stops after detection of ε > δ, but there is indication that ε follows particular trends
for each error type that could be exploited for error classification toward more rapid manual
or even automated reformulation of the model. In general, the system would be improved
via more formal inspection of the anomaly detection and classification conducted within
the performance monitoring scheme.
Further, based on complimentary progress in applying machine learning for intrusion de-
tection, an investigation should also be performed toward leveraging machine learning to
automate and improve portions of the proposed system. In particular, artificial neural net-
works already under investigation toward intrusion detection and classification [85] might
be extended to determine observation probability matrices O or track belief state b(t).
111
8.2.2 Expanding Complexity
We limited our state, action, and observation space to facilitate direct comparison with
an existing state-of-the-art MTD system. Now that we understand the gains possible, the
system should be expanded to incorporate additional complexity. Specifically, the quantity
and variety of both attacks and defenses included in the proposed system should be increased.
Greater dimensionality in terms of state, defense, and observation spaces would facilitate
consideration of other attack progressions and new MTD combinations. Our detailed vali-
dation study implements dimensionality of |s | × |ω| × |a| = 75. We also performed cursory
analysis confirming system operation at |s | × |ω| × |a| = 324. DESPOT has been verified
to handle |s | × |ω| × |a| = 106 [24]. Assuming that all 92 existing MTD [6] were incorpo-
rated into the system with one non-action so that |a| = 93 and constraint s ≡ ω holds, the
proposed system could support |s | ≤ 104, which would facilitate inclusion of other attack
types against individual hosts or expansion toward network-wide optimal MTD.
Toward expanding variety, there are certainly more MTD given the mentioned catalog,
but there are also other defensive mechanisms that could be incorporated that range in
sophistication from physically disconnecting resources from the network up through cyber
deception and decoying. The model might also be expanded to explore a hybrid system
that optimally triggers defenses based on assessed attack risk but also includes a latency
threshold to ensure a minimal reconfiguration rate is maintained.
8.2.3 Practical Adoptability
Finally, we have vetted this systemunder a variety of expected and realisticmodel parameters
to prepare for practical implementation of a POMDP-based cyber defensive scheme, but
this simulated operation is just the first step toward a practically adoptable system.
An investigation into specialized hardware for DESPOT decision making is an important
next step as simulation-based optimization involves highly repetitive calculations. General
purpose central processing units like those used in our simulations are not ideal for this task,
but both field programmable gate arrays and graphics processing units have shown promise
in similar applications [86], [87]. Either might improve the performance of the proposed
system by reducing the computational time required for decisions.
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Identifying the ideal upstream IDS to support the attack-phase-based observations required
by the proposed system is also a point for future work. Although uncertainty-handling
measures are at the core of the system, performance is still tied to the accuracy of intrusion
detection such that work to identify the specific IDS architecture that best compliments the
proposed system will only further improve our ability to accomplish optimized MTD.
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This appendix details the specific model parameters used in the validation study wherein













Figure A.1. Five phase attack process used for validation of proposed system
A POMDP is fully described by {s, a, ω, P,C,O, γ}. For the validation study, the following
parameters were used: States are aligned with each of the five attack stages such that
s = [s1, s2, s3, s4, s5].
Actions are drawn from a non-action, a service reconfiguration, and an IP address reconfig-
uration such that
a = [a1, a2, a3].
Observations from the upstream IDS are aligned with the possible states such that ω ≡ s
and thus
ω = [s1, s2, s3, s4, s5].
State transition probabilities in the absence of defense, P1, were determined from honeypot




0.6611 0.2300 0.0856 0.0233 0
0 0.9235 0.0687 0.0078 0
0 0 0.7900 0.2100 0
0 0 0 0.5000 0.5000
0 0 0 0 1.0000

.
State transition probabilities under either defense, P2 or P3 were obtained as a function of
P1. For a2, we implement a service reconfiguration for which the state transition probability




µ 0 0 0 0
µ−µv
µ 0 0 0 0
µ−µv
µ 0 0 0 0
µ−µv
µ 0 0 0 0






With the specific values used in validation,
P2 =

0.8870 0.0767 0.0285 0.0078 0
0.6667 0.3078 0.0229 0.0026 0
0.6667 0 0.2633 0.0700 0
0.6667 0 0 0.1667 0.1667
0 0 0 0 1.0000

.




ρ 0 0 0 0
ρ−1
ρ 0 0 0 0
ρ−1
ρ 0 0 0 0
ρ−1
ρ 0 0 0 0











0.9987 0.0009 0.0003 0.0001 0
0.9961 0.0036 0.0003 0.0000 0
0.9961 0 0.0031 0.0008 0
0.9961 0 0 0.0020 0.0020
0 0 0 0 1.0000

.
These defenses have state-independent availability costs, c2 = −0.635 and c3 = −9.59. The








c1 + catk c2 + catk c3 + catk











Partial observability was explored over a range of detection probabilities, 0.75 ≤ pD ≤ 1.0,
under uncertainty conditions U1, U2, and U3 that result in observation matrices
OU1 =

pD 1 − pD 0 0 0
0 pD 1 − pD 0 0
0 0 pD 1 − pD 0
0 0 0 pD 1 − pD






1 0 0 0 0
1 − pD pD 0 0 0
0 1 − pD pD 0 0
0 0 1 − pD pD 0














0 0 1−pD2 pD
1−pD
2
0 0 0 1 − pD pD

,





This appendix includes additional results from the trials of the proposed system. First,
overall attack suppression and availability are presented for U1 and U2 in Figures B.1 and
B.2, respectively. Similar to the results for U3 discussed in Chapter 7, the system suppresses
over 99% of attacks while maintaining availability of 94% in both cases. Action visits under
the alternate cases followed the trends of U3 as the system selects a3 more than expected
here too. These results are presented in Figures B.3 and B.4. Examination of the results
for cases U1 and U2 was helpful in identifying the reflection of the impact of uncertainty












































































































Figure B.1. Performance metrics for case U1. The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equations 6.3 and 6.5, while the blue line
represents the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with












































































































Figure B.2. Performance metrics for case U2. The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equations 6.3 and 6.5, while the blue line
represents the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with
































































































Figure B.3. Action visit trends for case U1 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.4, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25
































































































Figure B.4. Action visit trends for case U2 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.4, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25
and 0.75 quantile indicated by the error bars.
Alignment between expected and actual state and observation frequencies support the same
conclusions detailed in Chapter 7 and were thus not included in discussion. We include
plots of the specific results here. The alignment between state frequency of occurrence with
























































































































Figure B.5. State visit trends for case U1 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.1, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25























































































































Figure B.6. State visit trends for case U2 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.1, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25

























































































































Figure B.7. State visit trends for case U3 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.1, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25
and 0.75 quantile indicated by the error bars.
The alignment between observation frequency of occurrence with the expected values



































































Figure B.8. Observation visit trends for case U1 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.2, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25


































































Figure B.9. Observation visit trends for case U2 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.2, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25



































































Figure B.10. Observation visit trends for case U3 The solid black line indicates
predicted performance based on Equation 6.2, while the blue line represents
the mean across simulated operation of the proposed system, with the 0.25




To validate the proposed system, we conducted simulations using the procedures and appa-
ratus described in this appendix. Each simulated attack starts from initialization conditions
b(0) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0] and s(0) = s1. From there, the workflow is as follows:
• Proposed system
Receives ω(t) from simulation controller
Performs belief update
Updates POMDPX specification file
Conducts DESPOT planning resulting in a(t)
Feeds a(t) to simulation controller
• Simulation controller
Receives a(t) from the proposed system
Returns ω(t) based on hidden s(t), POMDP specification, and pseudo-random
number generator
Simulated operation continues until s(t) = s5; at which point, the simulation controller stops
the simulation event.
C.1 Hardware
Simulations of different uncertainty conditions Ui and probabilities of detection pD were
conducted in parallel across eight Dell PowerEdge R420 blade servers, each having between
24 and 48 central processing units (CPU). CPUs were Intel Xeon E5-2430. Each server had
enough random access memory (RAM) installed to ensure that between four and eight GB
RAMwas available per CPU. Simulations were manually allocated to each server to ensure
that a ratio of at least one CPU per active DESPOT process was maintained.
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C.2 Software
Software versions and code snippets are listed to facilitate reproducing our results. Simula-
tion and analysis required software as follows:
• Pre-/Post-processing and analysis
MATLAB 2019b with MDP Toolbox [81]
pomdp-solve [82]
Python 3.6.9 with numpy 1.18.2 and matplotlib 2.1.1
• Proposed system
Python 3.6.9 with numpy 1.18.2, subprocess, and re packages
DESPOT [75]
• Simulation control
Python 3.6.9 with numpy 1.18.2 and random packages
GNU bash 4.4.20
Critical functions developed to support simulation of the proposed system are included
here. The simulation controller employs the pseudo-random number generators in Python
3.6.9 to return observation ω(1) and state s(1) based on input state s(0), action a(0), and the
POMDP specification of P and O as follows:
def simulation_control(state_0, action_0, P, O):
Pm = numpy.array(P[action_0][state_0])
Pm = numpy.cumsum(Pm)




obs_1 = next(x for x, val in enumerate(Om) if val > random.
random())
return (obs_1, state_1)
The Bayesian update takes previous belief state b(0), observation ω(0), action a(0), and
returns new belief state b(1) based on the POMDP formulation of P and O. The function is
performed as follows:





for k in range(0,n):




for k in range(0,n):
b_1[k] = b_1[k]/m
return b_1
The simulations are controlled via Python 3.6.9 using a subprocess to leverage DESPOT
software [75] to determine the next optimal action based on belief state b0, assuming that
the POMDPX is stored at file_loc, the DESPOT executable is located at ex_loc, and
DESPOT output is written to action_loc. Parameters selected as described in Chapter 5
were hard coded via the options -d, -t, -n representing depth, computational time, and
number of particles respectively. Code is as follows:
def DESPOT_action(b_0,file_loc,ex_loc,action_loc):
POMDPX_update(b_0,file_loc)
string = [ex_loc,’-s 1’,’--runs 1’,’-d 11’,’-t 40’,’-n 80’,’-
m’,file_loc]
with open(action_loc,’w’) as fout:
subprocess.call(string,stdout = fout)
return Get_action(action_loc)
Function POMDPX_update updates the POMDPX specification file following the format in
Appendix D with the new belief state b0 as follows:
def POMDPX_update(b_0,file_loc):
new_line = " <ProbTable>"
n = len(b_0)
for k in range(0,n-1):
new_line += str(b_0[k])












Function Get_action recovers a(1) from the text output of DESPOT using the regular
expressions package re as follows:
def Get_action(action_loc):
with open(action_loc, ’r’) as f:
data = f.read()





Sample Model Specification File
This appendix includes an example POMDP specification for use in the proposed system.
The specification is detailed in extensible markup language based on the template provided
by [75]. This example is written for the five state, three action model described in Chapter
7 and summarized in Appendix A. This example file is set up for uncertainty condition U3,
pD = 0.9 and b(t) = [0.0, 0.0, 0.309, 0.691, 0.0]. The code snippets included in Appendix
C are written expecting formatting exactly as listed here.
<?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’ISO-8859-1’?>




<StateVar vnamePrev="attack_0" vnameCurr="attack_1" fullyObs="false
">
<ValueEnum>st ts vs el xx</ValueEnum>
</StateVar>
<ObsVar vname="IDS">
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